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This thesis examines the Greek-Turkish ongoing rapprochement. This latest 
rapprochement effort followed closely two devastating earthquakes that hit 
Greece and Turkey consequently in 1999. The two nations sent official and 
private (NGO) relief help, including search and rescue teams, to the areas struck. 
This study examines whether there are tangible shifts in the policies of the two 
countries that could sustain the rapprochement, or whether the adjustment is 
superficial and could collapse as soon as any controversial issue(s) arise 
between the two nations. It approaches the question with the clarity provided by 
hindsight, employing three past case studies of similar endeavors of the two 
countries. By examining the three past cases as well as considering all empirical 
evidence for the present rapprochement, this thesis concludes that there is 
tangible evidence of a shift in Greek foreign policy toward Turkey, whereas with 
respect to Turkish policy, there exist encouraging rhetoric and gestures but no 
evidence of adequate reciprocity towards Greece on the political level. Finally, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The origins of Greek-Turkish interaction can be traced back through 
centuries of antagonistic history, rivalry, grievance and mistrust. For the Greeks 
the battle of Manzikert1 in 1071 A.D. led to the capture of Constantinople in 1453 
A.D., and the consequent disintegration of the Byzantine Empire. In 1821 Greece 
was the first county that declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, 
and is perceived by the Turks to have been expanding ever since. During the first 
quarter of the 20th century the Neo-Turks movement’s manifestation was the 
creation of the modern Turkish state by Mustafa Kemal, a.k.a. Ataturk. For the 
Greeks the successful outcome of the Turkish War of Independence stands in 
stark contrast with ‘the Asia Minor Catastrophe’. Hence, the conflictual and 
competitive relationship between the two countries has deep historical roots and 
is embedded in the respective cultures as “both states link their existence [as 
well as] an important part of their identity to experiences that are associated with 
negative images of the other side.”2 This relationship from its beginning was and 
remained for a long period of time a zero-sum game for both Greeks and Turks. 
The present status quo characterizing in the Greek-Turkish relations was 
established at the end of the First and Second World Wars.3 The Treaty of 
Lausanne,4 signed in 1923 and reviewed in Montreux in 1936, delineated the 
                                                 
 1 Manzikert was a town at the eastern approaches of Asia Minor in today’s Turkish-Iranian 
boarder where the first actual combat encounter between the Byzantines and the Ottoman Turks 
occurred, when the Selzuk Sultan Alparsan defeated the Byzantine Emperor Diogenes starting 
the conquest of Asia Minor. See Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), 5. 
 2 Stephen F.  Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 73. 
 3 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law at Sea (UNCLOS III) signed at Montego 
Bay in 1982 is an additional document establishing the legal principals in the Aegean, in which 
however Turkey is not a signatory part. 
4 For the complete context, see The Convention Respecting the Regime of the Straits and 
Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923 available from [http://80-
www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/mes/mes07/index.html;] Internet, accessed on July 24, 
2004. 
2 
Thrace land frontier and at the same time recognized Greek sovereignty over the 
islands of Lemnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria.  
After the Second World War, the Treaty of Paris,5 between the Allies and 
Italy, the Dodecanese islands ceded to Greece. Both, Greece and Turkey are 
part of the south-east Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula regional 
subsystem, where old enmities resurfaced after the end of the Cold War. The 
region was eloquently characterized by Winston Churchill as one “that produces 
more history than it can consume.” The system continues to constitute an 
anomaly within the security community of Europe. However, both Greece and 
Turkey have been Allies in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 
1952. Both are major actors in economic, political and even military terms in the 
Balkan region and rivals as they interact in their own strategic realm.  
Greek-Turkish relations have passed through many controversial phases 
as both countries have been engaged in a costly and protracted arms race in an 
effort to establish a “favourable balance of power.”6 Numerous crises over 
Cyprus or the Aegean, repeated roughly twice every decade since 1955, brought 
the two countries to the brink of war. The latest major crisis was that of 1996 over 
the Imia islands. The potential deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations continually 
surfaces as a significant threat to regional stability.7 
Nonetheless, following the Cold War paradigm, bilateral relationships also 
have enjoyed infrequent and relatively short periods of relaxed tensions or 
détente. Such periods were that of the 1930’s under the leadership of Venizelos 
and Ataturk, and that of 1952 when the two countries (as beneficiaries of the 
                                                 
5 For the complete content, see Treaty of Peace with Italy, February 10, 1947, available from 
[www.mfa.gr/greek/the_ministry/eny/1947_italy_treaty.doc;] Internet, accessed on July 25, 2004. 
 6 Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: 
Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," The review of 
International Affaires, Vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 2002): pp.1-25 at 1. 
 7  For scenarios and outcomes of a potential Greek-Turkish conflict see Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Class of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996), pp. 315; Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser ed., Sources of Conflict in the 21st 
Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), pp. 321-322; and 
Wayne P. Hudges Jr., Capt. USN (Ret), Fleet Tactics and Costal Combat, (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2000), pp. 321-347. 
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Truman Doctrine) joined NATO. Another attempt was initiated in 1988 between 
the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and the Turkish counterpart, 
Turgut Ozal which proved to be unsuccessful. 
The current rapprochement, now five years old, was initiated by the Greek 
and Turkish governments of Simitis and Ecevit, respectively. Foreign Ministers 
George Papandreou and Ismail Cem explored cooperative and consultative 
channels between the two countries amidst the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The effort 
acquired further impetus following the September 1999 earthquakes that visited 
both countries, and thus the titled earthquake diplomacy was coined. In the 
context of the mutual cooperation occasioned by the earthquakes, the 
rapprochement process was accompanied by a spectacular and unexpected shift 
in the Greek policy toward Turkey’s candidacy in the European Union. 
Interestingly enough the rhetoric used and the expectations that rose during the 
above periods of relaxed tension including the latest reveal surprising similarities. 
 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the ongoing rapprochement by 
exploring the following research question: Does the current rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey represent a paradigm shift for the two countries 
relationships, or is it just an epi-phenomenon? This main research question will 
be approached by addressing the following interrelated issues: 
 Under what circumstances have previous efforts of reconciliation 
started and why they failed? 
 What are the characteristics and the achieved progress of the latest 
rapprochement process? 
 What are the theoretical foundations of the latest rapprochement 
process? 
 Have both countries’ foreign and security policies been affected and 
to what extent?  
4 
This thesis argues that the current rapprochement, although instrumental 
for both countries, indeed represents a significant strategic paradigm shift of the 
Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey. On the other hand Turkish policy towards Greece 
is founded on and associated with the EU decision pertaining to Turkey’s 
accession. Moreover, all empirical evidence suggests that the future of the 
rapprochement has a direct analogy in the EU decision and its interpretation in 
Turkish domestic policy level. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
Methodologically this thesis is a single case study of the Greek-Turkish 
relationships and specifically of the relatively few periods of détente and 
rapprochement. The thesis will employ a comparative historical approach, and 
the examination of events will be organized in chronological order. In particular, 
the thesis will attempt to identify possible historical generalizations derived from 
previous failed rapprochements between the two countries and compare them 
with the present attempt. In doing so it will evaluate the latter’s significance, 
achievements and offer a comparative analysis.  
Historical analysis is a useful analytical tool for interpreting both the 
present and the future since  
 History is a diagnostic instrument that helps us to put a 
problem in its context and environment. It supplies a thread 
and helps us to create order among a mass of data; it 
provides patterns. No two sets of circumstances are ever 
entirely identical although there is often a general pattern 
that recurs frequently. 
 It helps us to avoid reinventing the wheel.  
 History does not provide solutions but a thought process, 
and we have to realize this and accept ambiguity and 
complexity. 
 History can help us to change things before we have to, 
which actually the basic purpose of strategic thinking is: 
foresee changes, act before they hit us, and prepare to 
benefit from the new situation.8 
                                                 
8 Fotios Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO, (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 
2003), 5. 
5 
The thesis will not address the Greek-Turkish disputes per se; however, it 
will refer to them and will provide ample reference to the already abundant 
relevant literature. It is based on a qualitative survey of relevant literature, which 
engages both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include 
treaties as well as speeches and essays of key policymakers from both Greece 
and Turkey. The secondary sources include scholarly analyses as well as 
various media reports. 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the viability of the current Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement is self evident. The two countries are located in the eastern 
Mediterranean in great proximity with regions of strategic importance for the EU 
and the U.S., such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Vital Sea Lines of 
Communication cross the area, and the security of major energy transit routes 
are critical to the West Possible long term settlement will allow both countries to 
enjoy the benefits of the potential peace dividend and focus their recourses on 
the new century’s asymmetrical threats. Furthermore, it will help stabilize the 
volatile Balkan region and in general terms will benefit Europe, NATO and the 
West. By and large, a potential long lasting, peaceful settlement between Greece 
and Turkey could provide a test case that disproves the clash of civilizations (or 
clash of religions) thesis and substitutes it with a plausible cooperation of 
civilizations argument. 
 
E. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is structured in five chapters including introduction and 
conclusion. Chapter II provides an analysis on the theoretical context. The 
Greek-Turkish relations are examined in the context of the international relations 
theories by reference to the pertinent paradigms.  
Chapter III reviews three case studies of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. 
The first period is between 1930 and 1942, which followed the devastating war of 
6 
1919-1922 between the two countries. In the period in question dramatic 
improvement in the bilateral relations led to the conclusion between Venizelos 
and Inonu of a Treaty of Neutrality, Arbitration and Reconciliation. The second 
period is that between 1947 and 1955 in which events of the early Cold War 
period are analyzed. Once again the two countries enjoyed close political 
cooperation that resulted to the simultaneous entry in NATO in 1952. Finally, the 
last case examines the period of the late Cold War, between 1988 and 1992, 
wherein disputes between the two countries had already developed. 
Chapter IV analyzes the period between 1999 and 2004. During this time 
great expectations arose as both countries suffered from devastating 
earthquakes that spurred Greek-Turkish cooperation. These events were the 
precursor of the present political rapprochement. The analysis of this period will 
include the origins of the process as well as the achieved results and their 
corollaries in the overall Greek-Turkish strategic interaction. 
Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis by summarizing its findings. The 
main focus is on the viability of the rapprochement process. Moreover, the 
conclusion attempts to offer policy recommendations for the future. 
7 
II. STATES’ INTERACTION AND COOPERATION: A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The international political environment is often described as anarchic. This 
by no means implies that the international environment exists in a state of chaos. 
Anarchy is conceptualized as the mere absence of a supra-national government. 
In view of this characteristic how do states influence each other’s behavior as 
they interact, and moreover, what are the incentives and “under what conditions 
will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?”9  
In order for this thesis to provide a complete picture, of the Greek-Turkish 
interaction it is imperative to reference a survey of the pertinent international 
relations’ theoretical context. Therefore, this chapter will answer the 
aforementioned questions by identifying and analyzing the available “state 
conflict management strategies,” the predominant paradigms of strategies to 
initiate cooperation and the cooperation forms as well as expectations once such 
cooperation is achieved. In other words this chapter will provide an analysis of 
the relevant theoretical propositions that will serve as the theoretical foundations 
in which the Greek-Turkish rapprochement will be analyzed in the next chapters.  
 
B. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OR INFLUENCE STRATEGIES.10 
Conflictual relationships among states, as in the Greek-Turkish interaction, 
are in reality bargaining situations and as Thomas Shelling has observed, “a 
conflict is a kind of contest, in which the participants are trying to win.”11 By 
characterizing conflict as a bargaining process it is of outmost importance to note 
                                                 
9 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 3 also 4, 
6. 
10 The codification is attributed to Alexander George, see Alexander L. George, "The Need 
for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries," Comparative 
Strategy, Vol. 22 (2003): 463. 
11 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1960), 5. 
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that the main working assumption is that “in addition to the divergence of interest 
over the variables in dispute, there is a powerful common interest in reaching an 
outcome that is not enormously destructive of values of both sides.” 12 However, to 
maximize gains from bargaining situations, an appropriate strategy must be 
employed. The purpose of this strategy is to ultimately offer the prospect of 
influencing the adversary in a favorable manner. These strategies include inter 
alia, the deterrence strategy, the reassurance strategy, and the initiation and 
sustainmenet of cooperation. At this point it is essential to note that in order to 
furnish the most appropriate influence strategy a state must be classified in a 
qualitative manner reflecting its external attitudes, apart from the well known 
classification as “status-quo” or “revisionist.” Charles Glaser has elaborated 
further on states’ categorization and as he points out  
…states, according to their motives for expansion, can be divided 
into two categories: security driven (or not-greedy) and non-
security-driven (or greedy). Greedy states are willing to incur costs 
or risks for “non security expansion,” while a non-greedy state is 
unwilling to run such risks. Potentially insecure states are inclined 
to be insecure in the face of military capabilities that they believe 
threaten their ability to defend themselves. By contrast, “always-
secure” states recognize that the defender is interested in its 
security and would use force only in response to aggression.13  
 
1. Deterrence Strategy 
Deterrence strategy is conceived as a competitive strategy emphasizing in 
the manipulation of threats associated with the use of force. Morgan defines it as 
“… an attempt by one actor to convince another not to attack by using threats of 
forceful response to alter the other’s cost-benefit calculations.”14 According to 
Mearsheimer the strategy “in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent 
not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 5-6. 
13 Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining 
the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 501-502. 
14 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44. 
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estimated costs and risks.”15Consequently, the core assumptions on which the 
theory rests upon are the following:  
 First, the pre-existence of an adversary posing security threats 
 Second the actors involved are rational, and  
 Second, the unwishful action has not yet occurred.  
Deterrence theory distinguishes between two types of deterrence 
strategies, namely general and immediate ones. According to Morgan, 
[i]n general deterrence an actor maintains a broad military 
capability and issues broad threats of a punitive response to an 
attack to keep anyone from seriously thinking about attacking. In 
immediate deterrence the actor has a military capability and issues 
threats to a specific opponent when the opponent is already 
contemplating and preparing an attack. Thus an immediate 
deterrence situation is a crisis or close to it, with war distinctly 
possible, while general deterrence is far less intense and anxious 
because the attack to be forestalled is still hypothetical.16 
Moreover, deterrence is a challenging strategy to employ. In view of the fact that 
the strategy is associated with the potential use of force if deterrence strategy is 
to be successful, attention should be paid in the prescriptions of the relevant 
theoretical framework set by the deterrence theory. That is the strategy should 
be based on the theoretical notions of credibility and stability, and their balance. 
Elaborating further on the theoretical notion of the strategy’s credibility, 
Stein asserts that “ if deterrence is to work, the defender must carefully define the 
unacceptable action, communicate the commitment to punish transgressors or to 
deny them their objectives, possess the capability to carry out this threat, and 
demonstrate resolve to do so.”17 
The next critical aspect of deterrence theory is the maintenance of 
stability. A deterrent strategy could be much more successful when it makes the 
most credible threats without escalating a conflict. However, such an endeavor is 
                                                 
   15 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 14. 
16 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 9. 
17 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip Tetlock, Behavior, Society, 
and Nuclear war, 3 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10. 
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not an easy achievable task, since pertinent threats could be easily 
misinterpreted and exacerbate a crisis. Thus instead of crisis prevention the 
system enters a destabilizing crisis escalation spiral. To elaborate further, “the 
deterrer might take steps that looked to the opponent like plans not to retaliate 
but to attack and, concluding that war was unavoidable; the opponent could 
conclude it had better launch the planned attack. Then deterrence would really 
be unstable because it would make both sides strongly predisposed to attack.”18 
War may occur, then, inadvertently as a result of the escalation spiral in an 
“action-reaction” sequence in situations where states concerned about their 
security are made insecure by the actions of an adversary. States’ insecurity 
emanates from the difficulty of ascertaining intention, and therefore each side 
overestimates the magnitude of the threat. To overcome the inherent limitations 
of deterrence as an influence strategy, the cooperative strategy of reassurance 
has been conceived and will be analyzed in the section that follows. 
 
2. Reassurance Strategy 
The cooperative strategies broadly described in the literature as strategies 
of reassurance, “are conceived as a set of strategies that adversaries can use to 
reduce the likelihood of a threat or use of force.”19 The essence of the 
reassurance strategies is to communicate to the adversary that an alternative 
exists on the diplomatic field, or more generally that “one is not contemplating 
actions harmful to [the adversary’s] interests.”20 The provided alternative will 
eventually alleviate some of the adversary’s needs or weaknesses with the 
ultimate intention of reducing the likelihood of resorting to armed confrontation. 
“They include a combination of actions that minimize the risks of associated with 
deterrence and promote cooperation among states in conflictual relationship. The 
test of the effectiveness of strategies of reassurance is their contribution to the 
avoidance of war, the reduction of tension, and, ultimately, the creation of 
                                                 
18 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 20. 
19 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 9. 
20 George, "The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of 
Adversaries," 466. 
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alternatives to the threat or use of force among adversarial leaders who are 
hostile and suspicious of one another.”21 
Stein identifies the following five prominent types or techniques of 
implementing reassurance strategies:  
• First, reassurance through restraint.  
• Second, reassurance through norms of competition.  
• Third, the strategy of reassurance through irrevocable commitment.  
• Fourth, reassurance through limited security regimes.  
• And finally reassurance through reciprocity.22 
From the aforementioned five strategies one should note that “the strategy of 
reassurance through irrevocable commitment,” “reassurance through limited 
security regimes” and “reassurance through reciprocity” are pertinent to the 
Greek –Turkish interaction and this thesis will provide further analysis in the 
following chapters.  
One of the most ambitious techniques or strategies for tension reduction 
identified by Stein is the “reassurance through irrevocable commitment.” The 
essence of this technique is to undertake a largely symbolic gesture in an effort 
to fundamentally alter the belief that adversaries hold for each other and 
eventually change the nature of the whole relationship. As Stein observes this 
commitment is useful “… to a defender in a deterrence relationship to signal its 
intention to negotiate and thereby reduce the cost to a would-be challenger of the 
status quo.” This strategy should be employed “when leaders recognize that 
misperception and stereotyping govern their adversary’s judgment as well as 
their own […] to reassure their adversary of their benign intentions and create 
                                                 
21 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 35. 
22 For an elaborate analysis on all five reassurance strategies see Ibid., 35-56. 
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incentives for negotiation.”23 The attempt to make this kind of gestures however, 
is not simplistic. Implementing such a technique contains intrinsic impediments. 
Such difficulties are associated first, with constraints set by the domestic politics 
of each of the adversaries, and second, with the relative significance of the 
presented offer. That is, leaders often start the process by making reversible 
offers that are associated with less significant issues and represent low political 
cost, which in turn makes them less credible.24  
“Reassurance through limited security regimes” refers to the 
establishment of technical arrangements among adversaries, such as limited 
arms control provisions, the creation of buffer zones, or the sharing of 
intelligence information that could diminish the accidental or miscalculated 
precipitation to violence.25 The basic preconditions for those agreements are a 
mutual aversion to war and the maintenance of an unchallenged general 
deterrence status. The whole process could collapse, however, if one adversary 
defects, especially when the main issues at stake concern security.26 As a final 
point “reassurance through reciprocity” in itself represents a family of two 
strategies based on reciprocity that will be analyzed in the section that follows. 
 
3. Strategies of Reciprocity 
The anarchic nature of the international environment makes cooperation 
among states difficult to attain. In order for cooperation to be achieved “since no 
best [and universal] strategy to use”27 exists, two strategies based on reciprocity 
have been developed aiming to reduce tensions and ameliorate the “prisoners’ 
dilemma”28 which is the transformation of cooperation in such an environment. 
                                                 
 23 The most prominent example of implementing this strategy is referred as President 
Saddat’s visit to Tel-Aviv and his address to the Israeli political leadership and public during the 
Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement of the mid 1970’s. Ibid, 42-43. 
24 Ibid., 44-45. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid, 50-51. 
27 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 27. 
28 Ibid., 3-12. 
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These strategies constitute cooperation a tangible alternative for states to opt, 
and are the strategy of “tit-for-tat”29 and the “gradual reciprocation in tension 
reduction.”  
 
a.  Tit for Tat 
This strategy was developed by Axelrod as the product of a series 
of computer tournaments. “Tit-for-tat is the strategy of stating with cooperation, 
and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move.”30 In other 
words, it calls for the first move in the diplomatic arena to be a cooperative one, 
while consequent moves follow the rule of strait reciprocity to the adversary’s 
moves. The underlying assumption of the “Tit-for-tat” is that the adversary is a 
rational unitary actor and as such calculates cost and benefits.31 The purpose of 
manipulating costs and benefits is to make the benefits of not initiating the 
planned action greater than the costs of resorting to the use of force. In other 
words, during the implementation of this strategy the aim is to provide to the 
adversary tangible evidence that cooperation is a more attractive option than 
defection. 
If this strategy is exercised successfully for a long period of time, it 
could create a model of cooperation which overcomes deep-rooted mistrust. In 
any case it requires beginning with an impressive move on a highly risky issue, in 
order to draw the other side’s attention.32 According to Axelrod, the robust 
success of “tit-for-tat” as a cooperative strategy is attributed to the “combination 
                                                 
29 George labels this strategy as “Eye-for-an-Eye,” see George, "The Need for Influence 
Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries," 472. 
30 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, viii. 
31 Ibid., 7. 
 32 Critics observe three potential shortcomings: first, it overlooks the fact that in enduring 
conflictual; trust is absolutely necessary to elicit cooperation; second, it focuses on states that 
behave as self-interested egoists and not competitors who are likely to defect in order to pursue 
higher relative gains; and third, it cannot reduce the risks of escalation if one actor does not 
behave as prescribed. See Deborah W. Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State 
Treaty," International Organization, Vol. 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 30-31, and Stein, “Deterrence 
and Reassurance,” 54. Moreover, since tit-for-tat is a product of computer tournament, it bases its 
findings on repeated interaction of the same game thus assuming that states will indefinitely 
repeat the same interaction. 
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of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it from getting 
into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting 
whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. 
And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term 
cooperation.”33 
 
b. Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction 
Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction or GRIT is based upon 
the premises that a set of initial cooperative gestures independent of the 
adversary’s actions will gradually lead him to reciprocate in the effort to “create 
gradually an atmosphere of mutual trust within which negotiations on critical 
political and military issues will have a better chance of succeeding.”34 Once the 
adversary reciprocates, his action should be rewarded with a more conciliatory 
action. This technique is based on the fundamental assumption that the 
dynamics of the relationship between the two adversaries is based upon their 
mutual misperception. In order to alter the misperception a cognitive change is 
necessary and consequently GRIT gestures are designed and executed in an 
effort to overwhelm the psychological resistance at the cognitive level instead of 
the rational decision maker level, thus “removing distrust between states and 
thereby paving the way for relaxation of tensions.”35 After all, since tension 
reduction and the consequent cooperation is associated with the adversary’s will 
to reciprocate, as Stein observes “[a] cooperative move is unlikely to be 
reciprocated if an adversary has a long-standing and deeply held negative 
images that have been reinforced over time.”36  The recommendations of this 
cooperative strategy, summarized by Larson propose inter alia that: 
                                                 
33  Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 54. 
34 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana, ILL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1962), 88. 
35 George, "The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of 
Adversaries," 471. 
36 Stein, Deterrence and Reassurance, 54. 
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 The series of actions should be publicly announced in 
advance and described as part of a deliberate policy of 
reducing tensions.  
 Each action must be carried out on schedule, regardless of 
whether the other state reciprocates.  
 Along with the announcement of each unilateral action, the 
initiator should include an explicit, invitation for the other party 
to reciprocate in some way, but no quid pro quo should be, 
demanded in advance.  
 The series of actions should be carried out over a period of 
time, even without reciprocation.  
 The unilateral initiatives should be unambiguous in intent and 
capable of being verified.  
 The strategist should not make unilateral initiatives that would 
reduce the state’s capacity to retaliate, […], should the target 
state view unconditional concessions as a sign of weakness 
that could be exploited.  
 The strategist should retaliate immediately against any 
aggressive or exploitative actions by the target, but only 
enough to restore the status quo.[…]  
 Any act of reciprocation by the adversary should be rewarded 
with an incremental increase in cooperation. GRIT is designed 
to reverse the arms race and lead to spiraling tension 
reduction ….37 
Although GRIT resembles the tit-for-tat strategy in cooperating on the first 
move and retaliating against exploitation, it differs in four important ways: First, it 
does not presuppose immediate reciprocation from the other side and therefore it 
insists on taking unilateral initiatives; second, it relies on public statements of 
intentions, whereas tit-for-tat is more a tacit process; Third, it refers to a wider 
area of activities than tit-for-tat, which is limited to specific actions; Last but not 
least, it must make moderately risky concessions to build trust.38 
 
C. STATES’ COOPERATION AND EXPECTATIONS 
In the anarchic international environment, theorists are divided between 
three overarching paradigms to explain states’ cooperation. Each of these 
paradigms, which are well known as realism, liberalism and finally functionalism, 
                                                 
37 Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," 32, [emphasis mine]. 
38 Ibid. 
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has different set of starting assumptions which will be further analyzed in the 
sections that follow. 
 
1. Realism  
Realism has been the predominant paradigm in explaining states’ 
interaction especially since World War II. To theorists espousing realism, the 
essential assumptions about the characteristics of world affairs are explicitly that 
“states are the dominant and unitary actors in international relations calculating 
ends and means rationally; the international system is anarchic, constituting a 
self-help system; and  rationale states calculate their interests in response to the 
power structure of the international system.”39 Additionally, states operating in 
the anarchic international environment “are preoccupied with power and security, 
are pre-disposed toward conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate 
even in the face of common interests.”40  
The preoccupation of states with the maximization of their power and 
security as well as their relative gains, combined with the nature of the 
international system and the inherent difficulty to easily distinguish between 
defensive and offensive armaments creates the “security dilemma.” The security 
dilemma refers to the notion that the efforts of a particular state to increase its 
own security, ironically enough erode the first state’s security. As Posen 
indicates, ”what seems sufficient to one state’s defense will seem, and will often 
be, offensive to its neighbors. Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous 
and secure, they react by trying to strengthen their own position. States can 
trigger these reactions even if they have no expansionist inclinations.”41 
Consequently, states find themselves unintentionally locked in a spiral of 
                                                 
39 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on 
U.S. Foreign Policy, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 14-15. 
40 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," International Organization, 
Vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 488. 
41 Barry Posen, “The security dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, Ethnic 
Conflict and International Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 104. 
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escalating antagonism and further employing de-stabilizing arms build-up.42 An 
operating security dilemma, according to the theory cannot be abolished but only 
ameliorated, because most often states perceive other states as “either harboring 
aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the future.”43 
This said, in this realist anarchic and self-help system, states’ cooperation 
primarily takes the form of alliance formation. Alliances in turn are formed as a 
response mechanism, to balance the power of the dominant state in the system, 
or to balance the perceived threat44 which a particular actor – not necessarily the 
most powerful one – is presenting to the other states. Cooperation between 
adversaries, due to the starting assumptions of realism is not an effortless 
achievable task. 
In principal, the incentive for two states in an adversarial relationship to 
cooperate is provided “when risks of competition exceed the risk of cooperation, 
rational state-actors could and should direct their self help efforts towards 
achieving cooperation. The strong assumption is that normalization of the 
bilateral relations would provide both countries with greater security than 
conflictual alternatives.”45 As Jervis points out 
… if each state pursues its narrow self-interest with a narrow 
conception of rationality, all states will be worse off than they 
would be if they cooperated. Not only would cooperation lead to a 
higher level of total benefits…but it would lead to each individual 
actor’s being better off than he would be if the relations were more 
conflictual. States are then seen as interdependent in a different 
way than is stressed by the theorists of deterrence; either they 
cooperate with each other, in which case they all make significant 
gains, or they enter into a conflict and all suffer losses.46 
                                                 
42Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 62-67. 
43 Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in 
The Aegean, (New York: Routlege, 2004), 4. 
44 The Alliance formation takes the form of balancing or bandwagoning and the perceived 
threat stems from the aggregate power, the proximity, the offensive capabilities and the offensive 
intentions of a specific state. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power," International Security, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985): pp.3-43 at 9,. see also Stephen Walt, 
The Origins of the Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), ch. 2. 
45 Couloumbis and Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic 
Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," 3. 
46Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 67. 
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Once cooperation is achieved, the consequent decrease of the military 
uncertainties allows states to refocus on their technological as well as economic 
successes and shortcomings and replace military competition; hence the 
increased possibility to resort to the use of force, with economic competition.47  
However, and in order for cooperation to be achieved “states must employ and 
develop ingenuity, trust, and institutions if they are to develop their common 
interests without undue risks to their security.”48 
 
2. Functionalism  
The functionalist approach to states’ cooperation and integration was first 
developed in the 1940s by David Mitrany.49 This method for resolving and 
maintaining peace between countries claims that cooperation in non-political 
areas will increase the possibility of political integration between two different 
systems. Mitrany argued that in the 20th century international system, the 
manifestation of a web of interdependent technical issues “could be best 
addressed by highly trained professionals rather than politicians,” in a de-
politicized environment. 50 
Establishing functional cooperation between states and political systems 
based on their mutual needs would eventually create an expanding network of 
structures and procedures that would evolve to other areas of cooperation in the 
form of institutions. According to the underlying logic of the functionalist process 
of integration, cooperation between two systems at a unit level will gradually 
have a “ramification” effect and ultimately lead to integration of the systems. The 
direct effect of the functionalistic concept of states’ relations when expanded is 
                                                 
47Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International politics," International Security, 
Vol. 18 (Autumn 1993), 59-61. 
48Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 67. 
49 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1943). 
50 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1996), 422. 
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the gradual reduction and ultimately the eradication of “war by transformation of 
behavioural patterns from conflictual to cooperative.”51 
 
3. Liberalism  
Liberalism presents a major challenge to the realist approach on the 
international relations theory domain. The liberalist theoretical paradigm does not 
challenge the nature of the international system, which remains anarchic; 
however, it does differentiate from the realist notion that the state is the primary – 
billiard ball type - rational actor in the international domain,52 in the context of 
state’s interactions. Where realism bases its premises on power liberalism is 
based on exogenous democratic ideals. Theorists espousing liberal theories of 
international relations are emphasizing on the domestic and transnational groups 
of individuals that influence the state’s interests, preferences and associated 
decisions. “… Liberals believe democratic society, in which civil liberties are 
protected and market relations prevail ….”53 Liberal theorists in a broader sense 
argue that  
 [T]he fundamental agents in international politics are not 
states but individuals acting in a social context –whether 
governments, domestic society, or international institutions. 
 [T]he interests and preference of governments have to be 
analyzed as a result of domestic structures and coalition-
building processes responding to social demands as well as 
to external factors] 
 [I]nternational institutions, that is, “persistent and connected 
set of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral 
roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations and 
opportunities to state actors in a similar way as the 
international distribution of power.54 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 One of  best known works that challenges the rationality as well as the unity of the 
state’s decision making apparatus  is presented in the bureaucratic models concept of Graham T. 
Allison, “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review 
(September 1969), as reprinted in John J. Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical 
Essays, 2nd ed., (Harper Collins, 1966). 
53 Scott Burchill, Theories of international relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 
63. 
54, Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 25. 
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By and large, cooperation is based on the assertion “that states seek to 
maximize their absolute gains [in the long run] and are indifferent of the gains 
achieved by others.”55 Liberalism asserts that externalizing the politics based on 
democratic principals and applying them to the international relations realm leads 
nations to “gain something even if all do not gain equally.”56 Moreover, since 
states continue to interact in the international environment “without a central 
authority to force them to cooperate with each other,” membership in institutions 
provides a further incentive, a mechanism, to ameliorate the “prisoner’s 
dilemma,” in which cooperation is transformed as already mentioned. 
 The liberal school of thought, although there is no agreement among 
theorists on the naming convention provides three approaches for explaining 
states interaction. Risse-Kappen names them as “republicanism, institutionalism, 
and transnationalism.”57 Liberal republicanism based on Russet’s “democratic 
peace theory,” asserts that democracies do not wage war against other 
democracies, since first the norms that govern the decision making process are 
oriented toward establishing nonviolent, compromise oriented solution, and 
mutually accepted solutions; And second, reciprocal institutional constaints 
imposed by the existing check and balances embedded in the democratic form of 
government further argue against resorting to state-sponsored violence.58 
Institutionalism further developed the 1940s functionalistic approach into 
the principal of “Complex Interdependence.” According to Keohane and Nye, 
membership in international institutions leads states to significantly broaden their 
respective conception of national interest. In turn, this fact further widens the 
scope of cooperation. In addition, the interdependence concept emphasizes the 
existence of multiple channels of communications among states, and the 
                                                 
55 Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, 3, [emphasis mine]. 
56 Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War 
World, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 24. 
57 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 26. 
58 For further analysis of the terms by which cooperation among nations is governed in the 
Democratic Peace concept see Russett, Grasping The Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-
Cold War World, 25-30. 
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predominance of issues other than security.59 Institutions thus become means of 
facilitating cooperation as states accessing the provided multilateral forums set 
their agendas, form coalitions and to seek non-conflictual solutions to the existing 
problems.60   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The two main schools of international relations theory are the realist and 
liberal schools. The power of the realists lies in the parsimony of their arguments 
and the generic notions of power and anarchy that they invoke. However, realism 
has failed to provide an adequate explanation of milestone events in the 
international relations realm.61 The liberal school on the other hand has focused 
on the interdependence and the interaction among states based on international 
institutions, behavioral norms and cooperation. Moreover, both schools have 
concluded that cooperation is neither automatic nor self generating. Instead it 
emanates from manifold processes which include common interests, shared 
perceptions, customs and “the machinery of diplomacy” and so on.  
However, both paradigms agree on at least one basic premise. Both 
concur that cooperation potential exists and can be achieved with the ultimate 
goal to eradicate or at least ameliorate the conflictual relations among states. 
While the theory prescribes cooperative and competitive strategies, the ultimate 
decision of the rational state actor as to which strategy to implement is based on 
the criteria of states’ categorization which provide the necessary theoretical 
context to classify states based on the perceptions each actor holds regarding 
his competitors’ or cooperatives’ intentions and motivations. 
                                                 
59 For an elaborate analysis of the characteristics of interdependence see Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
1989), 24-35. 
60 Ibid., 36. 
61 For example according to realism the end of the cold war was to come not through a 
peaceful collapse but through a hot interaction between the two adversarial blocks. Moreover, 
realism had predicted that NATO would be dissolved since its main threat providing the cohesion 
among the allied nations was dissolved. However, NATO is present long after such prediction 




















































This chapter examines three distinct case studies of Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. These cases constitute separate studies in their own right; 
however, the thesis will employ an analytic review of all three of them. These 
cases are the Venizelos initiative of the early 1930s; the early Cold War attempts 
in the context of the accession of the two countries in the Atlantic Pact (1949-
1952) and last but not least the attempt of the late 1980s between Andreas 
Papandreou and Turgut Ozal a.k.a. the “Davos spirit.” The chapter will address 
the following questions: 
 The incentives behind these policy shifts and the procedures under 
which they were initiated. 
 How extensive were the bilateral relations that were reached? 
 What were the achievements of these efforts in the political 
sphere? 
 What were the reasons that led all three efforts to fail and finally 
collapse? 
 
B. THE VENIZELOS – ATATURK LEGACY: 1930-1942 
[T]he History of Turkish-Greek relations since 1930 ought to be 
read, marked and inwardly digested by all nations of Europe. For if 
the hatchet can be buried by two peoples who have been burdened 
by the terrible Greek-Turkish heritage of mutual injury and mutual 
hatred, there is no excuse left for any of the rest of us to confess 
ourselves morally incapable of performing the same feat.62 
Having a general understanding of the Greek-Turkish relationships the 
above quoted Economist extract makes one wonder when it was really written 
                                                 
 62 “Sound Sense in the Near East,” The Economist, May 20, 1933, as cited in Bahcheli, 
Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, 189. 
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and to what specific period it refers to. Moreover, if two countries have formed a 
paradigm of relations that could have served as a model for the war torn 
European Continent, what occurred especially and this period ended deserves to 
be addressed. 
While the Lausanne Treaty63 established the status quo and the border 
arrangement between Greece and Turkey,64 bilateral relations were not formally 
settled. Bilateral relations were inhibited to grow further by the issue of financial 
compensation. This issue was as an immediate corollary of compulsory 
exchange of populations65 between the two former belligerents. Established by 
Article 11 of the Lausanne Treaty, a joint committee was unable to reach a 
settlement after five years of extensive deliberations. The refugees, one million 
Greeks and 400,000 Turks who expected to receive compensation for their 
respective property losses, were largely influential in the respective domestic 
policies and presented a further obstacle for a final settlement. Moreover, the 
Turkish government initiated a discriminatory policy against the Greek-Orthodox 
minority of Turkey (the Greek orthodox population of Istanbul, Gokceada and 
Bozcaada as well as the Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from the 
                                                 
 63 For the negotiation process as perceived by the Turkish delegation and especially Inonu 
who would later become prime minister as well as President of the Turkey see Metin Tamkoç, 
The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey, (Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 175-178. 
 64 Bahcheli, however, argues that although for Turkey, the Lausanne settlement was 
considered an overall success, “many Turks believed that, in spite of their nation’s victory over 
the invading Greeks, Turkey had made significant territorial sacrifices by consenting Greek 
sovereignty over Western Thrace (with its Turkish majority) and, especially the Islands that ring 
her Aegean coast.” See Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, 31; in a similar  manner 
Celic notes that although the Treaty was considered a success, all the islands that Turkey had 
claimed remained with Greece and Italy with the exception of Gokceada (Imbros) and Bozcaada 
(Tenedos), see, Yasemin Celic, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport:: Praeger, 
1999), 29; for similar argumentation see also Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, 
Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War, (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1979), 61; according to Wilson however, “Turkey would never have signed the 
Treaty of Lausanne if the Ataturk government had been able to foresee the developments that 
were to take place in regard to the Law of the Sea in the latter part of this century.” See Andrew 
Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), 4. 
 65 During the period under review “the assumption that ethnically homogeneous states were 
the best vehicles for the protection of citizen’s rights was widely held. Following this assumption, 
there was greater willingness to consider redrawing of borders and exchanging populations as 
ways of creating more homogenous states.” The provisions of the Lausanne settlement were the 
best example of this prevailing school of thought. See Kathleen Newland, “Ethnic Conflict and 
Refugees,” in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 154. 
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exchange) and the Ecumenical Patriarchate setting limits to civil, political and 
religious rights. Such a policy was contrary to article 39 of the Lausanne 
Treaty.66 Finally relations were further strained during the 1925-1926 period by 
the irredentist claims against Eastern Thrace by the dictator Pangalos who 
threatened a Greek-Turkish war.67 
By 1928 and due to the aforementioned strains the Greco-Turkish 
dialogue was completely canceled, and the naval arms race in the Aegean was 
revived.68 During the next year it appeared that the two countries might resort to 
the use of military force. According to the Turkish newspaper Cumhuryiet that 
historically resonates, by and large, the official position of the Turkish 
government, a Greek-Turkish war was “inevitable.”69 
Amidst these rather pessimistic predictions about the future, Eleftherios 
Venizelos, who negotiated the Lausanne settlement for Greece, in his 1928 
electoral campaign introduced a revolutionary approach for the Greek foreign 
relations. Venizelos sought to put an end in the international isolationism of 
                                                 
66 Perhaps the most irritating event occurred in January 1925 when the Greek-orthodox 
Patriarch, Constantine VI was expelled from Turkey claiming that he was an exchangeable 
person. The matter was settled after an acrimonious debate and appeals to foreign governments 
as well as the League of Nations, in July 1925 when a newly elected Ecumenical Patriarch was 
settled in Istanbul. See Theodore A. Couloumbis, John Anthony Petropoulos, and Harry J. 
Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective, Modern Greek 
research series ; 2 (New York: Pella Pub. Co., 1976), 85-86. 
67 Pangalos took advantage of the opportunity provided by the 1925 Anglo-Turkish dispute 
over the border settlement between Iraq and Turkey. The border was left undecided during the 
Lausanne conference, reflecting on the future of the oil-rich Mosul province. For further analysis 
of all aspects of the Greek foreign policy under the brief Pangalos regime, see Harry Psomiades, 
“The Diplomacy of Theodore Pangalos,” Balkan Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, (Thessalonica, 1972), 
pp.7-12, see also Ibid., 87-88. 
 68 Alexis Alexandris, “To Istoriko Plaisio Ton Ellino-Tourkikon Sxeseon 1923-1954 [The 
Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954],” in Oi Ellino-Tourkikes Sxeseis 
1923-1987 [Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987], (Athens: Gnosi, 1991), 34-68; see also 
Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, 10-13. 
 69 Cumhuryiet, March 5, 1929 as quoted in Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the 
Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 38. Along the same lines, the Greek Foreign Minister 
Michalakopoulos revealed at the British Ambassador that “a Greek-Turkish war could not be 
considered inconceivable any more”, see Loraine to Chamberlain, Athens May 17, 1929, Foreign 
Office 371/13811/E2514 as referenced in Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-
Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 38. 
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Greece stemming as the immediate effect of the 1919-1922 Anatolia campaign.70 
The principals of the new foreign policy approach included: 
 First, respect of the territorial status quo, opposition to revisionism 
targeting the established status and abandonment of irredentist 
claims.71  
 Second, reciprocal avoidance of foreign entanglements and 
reliance on any particular great power.  
 Third, establishment of friendly relations with the neighboring 
countries as well as with the great powers.  
 And finally and perhaps most importantly reconciliation with 
Turkey.72  
In a speech delivered in Thessalonica on July 22, 1928 Venizelos outlined the 
proposed his revolutionary new approach stating: 
We wish to establish with Turkey not only good neighborly relations 
but also cordially friendly relations. We know that Turkey respects 
the territorial status quo [as established by the Lausanne Treaty] 
and must be assured that we do too.73 
                                                 
70 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Venizelos Again Supreme in Greece," Foreign Affairs (pre-
1986) New York, October 1929, 120-121.  
71 This marked the end of the ‘Great Idea’ which was the ambition to unite all Greek speaking 
areas into a central state, the Greater Greece, at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire, 
which like the Byzantine Empire would have its capital in Constantinople. This revival of the 
Byzantine Empire, often referred as “Greece of the two Continents and the five Seas,”  was used 
since 1844 to describe the country’s post independence irredentist aspirations and would have 
included the population along the Aegean coast of Anatolia, the Black Sea coast and parts of the 
inner Anatolia namely Cappadokia; for further discussion of the concept see Haralambos 
Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law, 
(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), 85-87; see also, Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across The Bosporus: 
The Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 220-224. 
72 Couloumbis, Petropoulos, and Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An 
Historical Perspective, 89. 
 73 Iphigenia Anastasiadou, “Ho Venizelos Kai To Hellino-Tourkiko Symphono Philias Tou 
1930,” [Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930] in Odysseus Dimitrakopoulos 
Thanos Veremis, eds., Meletimata Gyro Apo Ton Venizelo Kai Tin Epochi Tou [Studies on 
Venizelos and his Time], (Athens: Phillipotes, 1982), 314. 
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After winning the elections, Venizelos returned to premiership and his 
party became the dominant political power in Greek domestic affairs.74 On 
August 30th 1928, days after his election he dispatched a letter to the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Aras Tevfik Rousdi, addressed simultaneously to his Turkish 
counterpart, Ismet Inonu.75 In his letter Venizelos stated inter alia that: 
… you will fully understand my views as to the mutual advantages 
to be gained by regularising the relationship between our two 
countries on the basis of reciprocal trust and close friendship that 
will lead us to a warm understanding. If, as I feel sure, you share in 
these views, I trust that you will wish to take part in a final 
settlement of the differences caused by the exchange of 
populations and the treaties which followed. So we will establish 
conditions in which an agreement of friendship, as wide as possible 
in its conception, will constitute the firm foundation of a close 
friendship and a warm understanding between our countries …76 
The Turkish Prime Minister replied to Venizelos emphasizing the Turkish 
will to improve bilateral relations. However, at the same time Inonu reiterated the 
necessity to resolve a longstanding claim of the Turkish side pertinent to the 
existing economic differences. In his letter he articulated this claim in the 
following manner:  
… with our reciprocal desire to consolidate the relations between 
our two countries, neither having any designs on the other’s 
territory, on this firm basis, we have created a new, favorable 
climate for the establishment of a permanent friendship and for the 
concluding of an agreement which I steadfastly hope will be the 
happy result of this friendship, […]. I hope to see us finding solution 
for those unresolved problems of communication through the good 
will developed between us on both sides. When those problems 
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have been properly resolved, the treaty of friendship, neutrality and 
arbitration which will be concluded in a spirit of common 
understanding will certainly be a precious guarantee of the holy aim 
of peace. This result will certainly have a positive impact […] will be 
able to protect and to realize our common interests with so much 
greater effectiveness that our mutual friendship will be genuine and 
stable.77…………………………….. 
Venizelos immediately recognized the political precedence of the 
aforementioned discussions for the economic agreement. During autumn 1928, 
the Greek government accepted in principal to pay the amount claimed by 
Turkey. 78 One can plausibly argue that this motion was a political maneuver of 
the Greek side in order to sustain the ongoing negotiations. However, during the 
next year Ankara put forward even greater financial claims, which once again 
brought negotiations to a stalemate. Moreover, the Turkish side once more 
started using the Istanbul Greek-orthodox minority as leverage to achieve the 
desired outcome. At that point and in an effort to break the deadlock Venizelos 
relieved the head of his negotiation’s team and dispatched instead a respectful 
figure of the Greek Diplomatic corps, Spiridon Polychroniades.79 After seven 
months of intense negotiations on June 10, 1930, the Economic Pact was finally 
signed. Among its provisions the Pact recognized the necessity for Greece to 
compensate Turkey 425,000 pounds sterling marking a major Greek concession. 
Such a concession was clearly aiming at the greater cause of full restorations of 
bilateral relations.80   
Domestic reactions in Greece were strong, especially among the refugees 
that constituted a substantial portion of the electoral base of Venizelos’ party. 
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However, albeit the fact that some members of the parliament as well as the 
opposition leader Tsaldaris made a strong argument against rapprochement, 
Venizelos opted to ignore them. Indicative is the fact that in his speech for the 
ratification of the Economic pact at the parliament in relation to the public 
reactions Venizelos agued that ‘[…] public opinion when not favorable, I tend to 
educate it and not to be influenced by it.’81 In addition Venizelos was approached 
by various pro-Ottoman groups82 which sought his support to topple the Ataturk 
regime conspiring against the latter. However, Venizelos disregarded their 
appeals, and his opinion was solidified that the Ataturk regime offered a stable 
and reliable interlocutor, powerful enough to reach consensus and settle once 
and for all the Greek-Turkish disputes. As a result Venizelos on October 1930 
traveled to Ankara in a symbolic gesture. His trip aimed to conclude a web of 
accords that not only settled all outstanding issues but were enriching the context 
of bilateral cooperation. 
The accords included inter alia a Pact of Friendship, Arbitration and 
Reconciliation, a Commercial Convention; and a Naval Armaments Protocol 
which established naval parity in the Aegean,83 and ameliorated the bilateral 
naval arms race. Moreover, the two parts concluded on a Settlement Pact which 
gave relocation, settlement and freedom of movement rights to those who were 
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expelled during the clashes of earlier years, namely the 1919-1922 war. Bilateral 
relations were strengthened furthermore after the October 1931 official visit of the 
Turkish Prime Minster Inonu in Athens. Over the next two years the mutual 
consultation process was extended in the Balkan affairs. In 1933 the 
rapprochement was transformed in what became thereafter known as ‘Entente 
Cordial’ under which both countries mutually guaranteed their common frontier in 
Thrace and agreed on mutual consultation on all questions of common interest.84 
After four conferences85 the Balkan Pact between Greece, Romania, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia was formalized in 1934. Under the Pact the member 
nations agreed that in an event of aggression by a third party, directed against 
any of the signatories, they (Pact signatories) would collectively guarantee the 
frontiers of the encroached nation. Moreover, the four member countries agreed 
on a mutual consultation clause in the event of an emerging threat in the 
region.86  
The provisions of the Balkan Pact proved their significance in 1935, when 
a coup in Greece threw the country into turmoil with revisionist Bulgaria. During 
the crisis both Yugoslavia and Rumania announced their support for the Greek 
government. Turkey for her part and in an effort to dissuade Bulgaria initiated a 
noteworthy troop movement in the Turkish-Bulgarian boarder. Moreover, Turkey 
made an equivocal verbal announcement that any Bulgarian strike against 
Greece would be met with a Turkish invasion of Bulgaria.87  
The same conciliatory policy was further pursued by the Tsaldaris 
government, which succeeded Venizelos after his defeat in the 1933 elections. In 
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September 1933 the two governments renewed their economic agreements and 
signed the Ankara Friendship Pact. This was a military agreement, aiming at the 
mutual defense of both the Turkish and the Greek Thrace.88 Finally in 1938, 
under the personal overlook of Ataturk and Metaxas, who in the mean time had 
established a dictatorship in Greece, the chiefs of the Greek and Turkish General 
Staffs, General Papagos and Field Marshal Cakmak, reaffirmed and extended 
the Ankara Pact.89 
Tracing the reasons that led Venizelos to initiate the Greek policy 
reorientation vis-à-vis Turkey one can argue the following: First the necessity to 
guarantee the status and the rights of the Greek-orthodox minority; Second to 
establish a Greek-Turkish coalition to counter revisionist Bulgaria who sought to 
revise the established status quo.90  
On the other hand Turkey had no reason not to respond positively at the 
Greek “friendship attack.” The country under the Ataturk leadership, once the 
goal of survival of the newly founded republic was attained, had become a status 
quo state abolishing at the same time any irredentist claims. Moreover, given the 
deteriorating financial situation as a result of years of conflict, internal 
reconstruction and reform became the government’s first priority. As Bernard 
Lewis points out “Renouncing all foreign ambitions and all pan-Islamic ideologies, 
[Ataturk] deliberately limited his actions and aspirations to the national territory of 
Turkey as defined by the [Lausanne] Treaty, and devoted the rest of his life to the 
grim, and unglamorous task of reconstruction.”91 The rapprochement with Greece 
was facilitating this task; moreover it was considered part of the general shift in 
the Turkish foreign policy, the basic premise of  which was the country to “… 
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sought to steer itself back into a position of equality and cooperation with the 
main western powers without breaking links with Moscow.”92 The profound 
inspirers and supporters of this shift from isolationism towards engagement were 
Kemal Ataturk himself and his Foreign Minister Rustu Aras.93  
By and large the rapprochement and the consequent détente, between 
Greece and Turkey, initiated in 1930, thrived throughout the interwar period. In a 
further analysis and taking into account the empirical evidence as presented 
above, the policy was successful for four major reasons. First, in a remarkable 
historic coincidence both countries had strong governments, headed by 
undisputable and charismatic personalities. Venizelos and Ataturk were able to 
isolate themselves from domestic policies and opposition, exerting immense 
political pressure stemming from the perceptions of public opinion. This was 
especially true for Venizelos, since Turkey at the time was a “highly authoritarian 
single-party state.”94 Consequently, both political leaders were decisive in 
carrying out the burdens of the signed accords. Second, both countries needed 
to concentrate on domestic reconstruction after a protracted conflict. That 
dictated the use of the peace dividend provided by the rapprochement. Both 
sides reached an accord reflecting that point by utilizing policies of arms control. 
Limitation of the costly and at the same time destabilizing naval arms race 
reincarnated in this notion. Third, the international environment and specifically 
the expectations that arose in Locarno and Geneva provided a favorable 
overarching principle for the Greek-Turkish peace efforts.95 Last but not least, the 
rapprochement was required by common security and defense interests of the 
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two countries.96 As Hantzivasilliou points out for the period under examination 
“[f]or the first time in history the two nations came so close in creating a 
community of interests in the southern Balkan and eastern Mediterranean 
region.”97  
 After the death of Ataturk in 1938 and with the Second Word War ante 
portas, the trend of the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations was slowly but steadily 
beginning to reverse. There was a shift pertinent to the treatment of the Greek-
orthodox minority. Additionally, Kemal’s successor Inonu fostered a general 
foreign policy towards neutrality and the reversal of the territorial status quo, 
settled by the Lausanne Treaty. In other words Inonu was aiming to gain 
territorial increments at the expense of Greece, which was occupied by the Axis 
Powers in 1941.98 
 The first significant sign of policy shift occurred in November 1939, when 
the new Turkish government tangibly changed its attitude towards the minority. 
The anti-minority sentiment that was spread primarily in Istanbul reflected the 
Axis racist ideology. It was embraced and supported by the Foreign Minister 
Numan Menemencioglu, as well as the Chief of the Turkish General Staff Field 
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Marshal Tasvir Cakmak.99 This policy was confirmed in November 1942 when 
the Turkish authorities conceived and implemented the tax on wealth known 
thereafter as Varlik Vergisi. This was a largely discriminatory measure directed 
against the minorities that included the Greek-orthodox,100 and it resulted in 
economic stagnation as well as physical maltreatment of its members. It is 
important to note at this point that although Prime Minister Inonu was 
preoccupied with foreign policy decisions and allowed the government to take 
care of itself’, he personally directed and overlooked the implementation of this 
measure.101 The tax of Varlik Vergisi was finally repelled on March 1944, an 
action attributed primarily “to the desire on the part of the Turkish statesmen to 
appeal to the United States,”102 and in a broader sense to the desire of the 
Turkish officials to improve relations with the Western allies. 
 Inonu, contrary to all agreements signed between Greece and Turkey 
such as the Balkan pact of 1934, and the bilateral agreements of 1933 and 1938 
failed to declare war against Germany, when the latter invaded Greece through 
Bulgaria in April 1941.103 In other words Turkey breeched the fundamental 
principal of pacta sund servanta, which is the heart of international law and 
states’ relations, in the frame of the Balkan Pact and all relevant bilateral 
accords. Moreover, during the deliberations with Great Britain, pressing for the 
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Turkish entry into the war on the Allied side Foreign Minister Menemenecioglu 
“… raised [the] old demand for territorial compensation in the Dodecanese 
Islands, Bulgarian Thrace, and Albania. They [the politico-military establishment] 
even evinced a new interest in controlling the Greek port of Salonika, which […] 
would have given [to Turkey] the predominant position in the Aegean.”104 At the 
same time, as an evidence of a “flip-flop” policy, Turkey was negotiating with the 
Nazi regime, advancing by and large similar demands. The suggestion was that 
Turkish units were to guard the occupied Greek Islands of Chios, Samos and 
Lesvos, thus relieving the burden from the German High Command.105 Finally, a 
further proof of the Turkish decision to undermine Greek-Turkish relations is that 
the Turkish authorities failed to appoint an ambassadorial delegation to the exile 
Greek government. The deterioration of the bilateral relations was so sharp that 
the 1943 official visit, of the Greek Prime Minister, Tsouderos, to Ankara never 
occurred.106  
 
C. THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD: 1947-1955 
The end of WW II brought even more confusing days than those 
preceding it. Greece was struggling in a guerrilla war against communist 
territorial demands, with insurgents operating from bases of Marshal Tito’s 
Yugoslavia. Turkey, on the other hand, although unaffected by the devastation of 
war was facing Soviet advances to revise the Status of the Turkish Straits.107 
The British government, which was supporting the effort in Greece and Turkey 
                                                 
104 Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 30 October 1940, P.R.O., F.O. 
371/R8130/316/44, as referenced in Weber, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the 
Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War, 60; furthermore, Weber indicates that the 
primary intention of the Turkish Foreign Minister was “to bring the Dodecanese Islands and the 
Bulgarian Trace under Turkish jurisdiction,” see ibid., 208. 
105 Kroll to Papen, 29 April 1941, A.A. 1303/1314 as referenced in Ibid., 82; while the issue 
was dismissed Weber argues that it was not raised again as Turkey was aiming at the greater 
prize of the Iraqi province of Mosul, see ibid. 
106 Greece after the Nazi invasion and occupation established an exile government in 
Alexandria Egypt. Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-
1954,” 89 and 108. 
107 William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 4th ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-258. 
36 
both militarily and economically, in February 1947 announced that “British aid to 
Greece and Turkey would end in six weeks.”108 In other words the British, due to 
the financial devastation suffered as a corollary of the Second World War, 
contemplated withdrawing their support by March 1947 and thus creating a 
power vacuum. 
On the other hand the Soviet advances and encroachment policies 
mobilized the U.S. to devise in March 1947 and implement in the following years 
a set of policies to counter Communist infiltration in Europe. President Truman 
enunciated his doctrine making “… the policy of the United States to support the 
free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressure.”109 
Two months after the proclamation of the Truman doctrine, under the 
auspices of the Greek Vice President, Sophocles Venizelos, a joint committee 
was created in Athens with the task to promote the Greek-Turkish cooperation as 
part of a regeneration process of the former rapprochement. As early as the 
summer of 1947 the military cooperation for mutual defense consultation 
between the two Greek and Turkish General Staffs was revived. The newly 
established cooperation was endorsed, closely monitored and at a certain degree 
instigated by the U.S. as well as by Great Britain.110 During the next year the 
bilateral cooperation was enriched with economic as well as cultural 
agreements.111 Throughout the initial steps of this process the Greek side was 
keeping a precautionary stance. The reason was due to the Turkish policies 
towards the Greek-orthodox minority of Istanbul and the aforementioned taxation. 
Moreover, there is plausible evidence that the Turkish side was considering using 
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the Ecumenical Patriarchate as further leverage towards the Greek government, 
cognizant of the Greek sentiment on that issue. In addition, the territory of the 
Dodecanese islands was also another thorny issue since the Turkish side was 
utilizing backdoor policies to gain territorial increments. As mentioned above the 
final disposition of the islands was pending; moreover the Soviets were “… 
probing in the Dodecanese islands …”112 Finally the islands were ceded to 
Greece in the context of the 1947 Treaty of Paris and as reparations of the 
Greek-Italian War of 1940-1941.113  
The two final episodes of this era of the Greek Turkish relations can be 
summarized as the efforts of both countries to become members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and join the UN forces in the Korean War. The question of the accession 
of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance, which had already been 
considered by the North Atlantic Council in 1950, became a subject of prolonged 
consultation inside the Atlantic Alliance in 1951. In May 1951 the Greek and 
Turkish Governments, renewed their claim for membership. On the strategic 
plane it was common knowledge that the addition of the two countries would 
reinforce the southern flank of the Alliance, thus providing credible defense to the 
approaches of the Near and Middle East as well as Eastern Mediterranean. Just 
as vital were the transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), securing the 
SLOCs  of  Eastern  Mediterranean  passing  through the Suez Canal.114  On the  
                                                 
112 Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East : Great Power 
Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 404. 
 113 The Turkish straits, the Lausanne treaty, the Montreux Declaration and the Dodecanese 
Islands are intertwined in a complicated nexus of the international relations context during the 
early Cold War. Turkey was inhibited to advance any territorial claims in the Aegean since such a 
motion could provide the pretext for further Soviet demands pertinent to the revision, in particular 
the territorial and legal status, of the Turkish Straits. Alexandris, “The Historical Perspective of the 
Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1954,” 118. Moreover, and confirming  the aforementioned 
assertion, Vali points out the “… Turkish government considered it unwise to oppose the merger 
of the islands [the Dodecanese] with Greece despite some popular and military pressures,” see 
Váli, Bridge Across The Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, 227. On the British Foreign 
Minister Bevin’s advice to the Turkish government not to raise the subject, see Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Washington 1974, 173. 
114 Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years, 3 vols., vol. 3 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 359-361. 
38 
political plane however, some member governments feared that the admission of 
Turkey, which had a common frontier with Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, might 
aggravate international tension. 
Moreover Turkey in an effort to curb the opposition of some of the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance opposing her accession in the North Atlantic 
Pact decided to send a contingent under the UN flag in Korea. This provided an 
incentive to Greece to send her own expeditionary force in the Far East 
Peninsula.115 In other words both countries exploited the opportunity provided by 
the Korean War and their participation in the UN forces as an additional leverage 
to become members of the Atlantic Alliance, thus securing their defense interests 
towards Communist encroachment.116 
By 1951 the situation in the two countries had been sufficiently stabilized 
to allow them to participate in planning for the defense of the Mediterranean 
region. NATO meanwhile studied both political and military aspects, of the 
accession of the two countries, with a favorable outcome. A protocol inviting 
Greece and Turkey to join the Atlantic Treaty which modified the definition of the 
territories and forces contained in Article 6 of the Treaty was signed by the 
Council Deputies on October 1951. In February 1952, the two Mediterranean 
countries became formal members of the Alliance, thus initiating NATO’s first 
enlargement process as expressed in Article 10117 of the Atlantic Treaty and 
                                                 
115 Celic, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 36. 
116 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1998), 51. It must also be noted that according to President Inonu, Turkey view its participation in 
NATO as being accepted as “a respected member of the civilized world,” as quoted in Hale, 
Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, 117. 
117 Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty stipulates that:  
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may 
become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the 
Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United 
States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession. 
See NATO Basic Texts, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, available from 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 22, 2004. 
39 
thereby strengthening the Alliance's southern flank.118 At the time and throughout 
the Cold War both countries were considered as “… strategic Siamese twins 
guarding the vital gates of warm water entry into the Black Sea, and at the soft 
underbelly of the Soviet Union.”119  
In general and after a close examination of the exchange of visits of 
government official as well as military and bureaucracy officials, one can firmly 
support the argument that the two countries were deepening their relationship. It 
is imperative to note that even the Greek king visited Ankara and Istanbul during 
June of 1952, spurring a sequence of visit exchanges in a mutually cordial 
atmosphere.120 This improvement in Greek-Turkish relations was reflected in the 
rhetoric used in the statements of the officials of both countries which, while 
exploiting symbolism, significantly raised expectations. The Turkish President 
Celal Bayar, during his state visit to Greece in January 1954, described Greek-
Turkish cooperation as “the best example of how two countries who mistakenly 
mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal 
collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life.”121 During an official 
visit in Ankara the Greek Prime Minister Papagos declared that “… there is no 
issue between the two countries that cannot be resolved in a friendly way.”122  
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As part of the regional cooperation and with U.S. encouragement and 
guidance,123 both countries began discussions with Yugoslavia in an effort to 
revive the ‘Entente Cordiale’ of the 1930s. This resulted in 1953 in the signing of 
an “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation” that obliged the members to 
consult each other on matters of common interest, as well as on military affairs. 
The Agreement was transformed in the second formal Balkan Defense Pact in 
1954, with common defense provisions similar NATO’s Article 5. However, the 
pact proved to be “stillborn” and completely lost its significance with the 
improvement of the Russian Yugoslav relations after 1955.124 
Historical scrutiny of the domestic policies of Turkey after the Second 
World War and through the early Cold War years demonstrates the “transition [of 
the country] from a single party to a multi party system.”125 For Turkey to become 
“a member of the Western comity of nations”126 was imperative to advance its 
domestic politics to a more pluralistic context. Although “[t]he multiparty period in 
the history of the Turkish republic officially started in July 1945 …,”127 the 
democratization process did not entailed for Turkey the anticipated results. In 
stark contrast with Western societies, Turkish democratization led to a 
revitalization of Islam in society. This fact stemmed from the corruption of the  
                                                 
 123 One author further suggests that the greater strategic aim of the Balkan Pact was to 
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John O. Iatrides, Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review, (New York, NY: Pella Pub. Co., 
1980), 155. Turkey’s participation in the Balkan Pact was part of a prevailing trend of participating 
in regional security arrangements that included the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was in 1960 
transformed into CENTO. See Celic, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 37-80. 
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new social elites and “… the new ruling group, [which] used highly undemocratic 
methods, stifled freedom of expression and appeared to jeopardize Kemalist 
reforms.”128 
The trend in the bilateral relations context was once again sharply 
reversed after September 6, 1955 as a result of the thoroughly organized 
multilevel riots against the Greek-orthodox minority of Istanbul. Furthermore, it 
must be noted that the riots were extended even to the Greek contingent serving 
at NATO Regional Headquarters in Izmir.129 The riots were carried out by the 
nationalistic citizen’s association, “Cyprus is Turkish,” led by Hikmet Bil, editor of 
the newspaper Hurriyet. Moreover, the unrest was extended to looting, property 
destruction, and loss of life and intimidation of the Greek-Orthodox minority.130 
However, the unrest was not an isolated incident but part of a well orchestrated 
policy aiming to exert further leverage during ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus 
issue.131 In other words, the Menderes government “involved” in a way the 
Greek-Orthodox minority, since it was a well known, sensitive “nerve” of the 
Greek foreign policy, dating from the Venizelos era. Thus the Turkish policy of 
encroachment of the Greek-Orthodox minority was not aimed primarily at the 
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minority itself (though the results of such policy were a favorable byproduct) but 
at the Greek side, in the view of the tripartite discussions among Greece, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom for the future of Cyprus that were under way in London 
since August of the same year.132 Moreover, it should also be emphasized that 
according to Hale the Menderes government utilized the mounting of the anti-
minority sentiment as “… means of distracting attention from [its] domestic 
failures.”133 
The Greek-Turkish cooperation on one hand after the Second World War 
was cautious at its beginning primarily due to the Greek suspicion over the real 
Turkish intentions. On the other hand it succeeded primarily due to the existence 
of the common Soviet threat and the consequent will of both Greece and Turkey 
to join NATO.134 Moreover during the starting years of the Cold War both 
countries largely influenced by the U.S. and to a lesser extent by Great Britain 
‘subordinated their own national interests at the behest of alliance cohesion and 
the need for collective action’.135 In a repeating pattern when Turkey perceived 
her interests threatened in the context of the Cyprus issue, she did not hesitate to 
torpedo the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of the 1950’s. As Bahcheli further 
asserts “[a]s long as Greek and Turkish interests coincided, as they did for nearly 
a decade after the Second World War, there was no reason why their warming 
relationship could not have made further progress.”136 This progress never 
occurred. The next period of rapprochement was initiated almost thirty years later 
and will be explored by the next section of this chapter. 
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D. THE LATE COLD WAR ATTEMPTS: 1988-1989 
This period marks a great milestone in Word Affairs, as the precipitating 
events in the Soviet Union brought an abrupt end to the Cold War. In a parallel 
manner, this period also marked another “dramatic” Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement that would prove to be shortlived. This new effort came eight 
months after the high intense crisis of March 1987, over oil exploitation rights in 
the Aegean seabed.137 The issue of the Aegean Continental Shelf had 
resurfaced in January 1987 and the crisis reached its apex in the last days of 
March, bringing the two countries at brink of war for the first time since 1976. 138 
In late January 1988 the two Prime Ministers, Turgut Ozal of Turkey and 
Andreas Papandreou of Greece, met during the annual meetings of the World 
Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland. The two-day meetings took place in a 
mutually cordial atmosphere. A joint communiqué largely revealed the main 
motivation for the meetings and emphasized the necessity of avoiding 
confrontations that have the potential of escalating to hostilities. Specifically, 
paragraph 3 of the communiqué stipulated that: 
The Prime Ministers […] further elaborated on the recent crisis in 
the Aegean which brought the two countries at the brink of war, 
expressed at the same time their optimism introduced as the 
consequence of exchanged messages between them. They agreed 
that from now on such a crisis should never be repeated and both 
sides must concentrate their efforts for the establishment of lasting 
peaceful relations.139 
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Moreover, they called for intensification of bilateral contacts, reciprocal 
visits at all levels with emphasis on the encouragement of tourism and cultural 
exchanges. To this end two committees were established; an economic 
committee to explore the areas of cooperation, such as trade, joint ventures, 
tourism, etc., and a political committee which aimed to define the problematic 
issues, explore the potential of mutually identifying them and seek long lasting 
solutions. Moreover, a hotline between Ankara and Athens was established.140 
The aforementioned momentum was thereafter referred as “the spirit of Davos.” 
With the trend in bilateral relations slowly restoring, the Turkish 
government in a gesture of goodwill rescinded a 1964 decree that restricted 
property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey, and lifted visa requirements for 
Greeks visiting Turkey. In a reciprocal gesture Greece lifted its objections for the 
reactivation of the 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and the 
European Community.141 In the months that followed the Davos breakthrough, 
numerous meetings of the established committees, and reciprocal visits of 
various level officials at the two capitals, took place.  Most noticeably, in May 
military and diplomatic experts concluded an agreement on confidence-building 
measures (CBM’s), based on a Memorandum of Understanding under the 
auspices of NATO’s Secretary. It included inter alia a pledge “… to respect the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the 
high seas and international airspace of the Aegean.”142 Finally, in September, 
Foreign Ministers Karolos Papoulias and Mesut Yilmaz adopted a document 
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containing the “Guidelines for the prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the 
High Seas and International Airspace.”143  
The “Spirit of Davos” culminated in May 1988, with the visit of the Turkish 
Prime Minister Ozal in Athens, which was the first visit at this level for thirty-five 
years. With his rhetoric Ozal exploited symbolism, speaking about the history of 
the two nations and their grievances, as well as the period of cooperation 
between Venizelos and Ataturk. According to Volcan, Ozal’s “physiologically 
informed speech” was intended to “extend olive branch to Greece.”144 The Greek 
public opinion, however, did not react as in previous eras. As a result Birand 
asserts that the visit failed to meet its starting expectations.145 However, one 
must note, setting aside the public opinion sentiment, that within NATO both 
countries continued to veto each other’s country chapter at the NATO Defense 
Committee. Moreover, Greece objected Mersin’s port exclusion during 
negotiations of the conventional forces in Europe treaty in the frame of CSCE. As 
a final point astonishingly throughout this period the Greek and Turkish air forces 
were still engaged on an almost daily basis in dogfights over disputed parts of the 
Aegean airspace. In this manner the prospect of hostilities still remained a 
plausible option.146 
The Davos meeting and its consequent achievents marked a significant 
departure from previous policies, especially for Greece and A. Papandreou. 
Papandreou was first elected in 1981, employing strongly anti-west and anti-
NATO rhetoric, based on the notion of “independent” foreign policy. In relation to 
Turkey he was highly critical of the previous conservative Karamanlis 
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government, accusing it for unilateral concessions. After his election the policy 
was transformed towards more pragmatic grounds, contrary to the previous 
inflexible ideological positions.147 In relation to Turkey he claimed that the 
precondition for normalization of bilateral relations and resumption of dialogue 
was the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from Cyprus. Moreover, in 
December 1984 he made public the adoption of a new defense doctrine, 
according to which the main threat was perceived as stemming from Turkey, 
instead of the Warsaw Pact. Greece in the context of this defense doctrine 
gradually built a deterrent posture148 in an effort to deter the perceived Turkish 
revisionism leaving aside reactive policies.149 Methodologically the process 
initiated at Davos was the triumph of personal diplomacy for the Greek prime 
minister. 
As a result one can argue that Papandreou’s incentives for the Davos 
process can be attributed to the following: First, the Greek prime minister realized 
abruptly that Greece almost reached a state of war, which would have had 
devastating effects on the fragile Greek economy. Economic issues were of 
paramount importance, since Greece from 1985 had been in a period of 
austerity. Contemplated defense cuts could redirect economic recourses to 
finance more popular social policies. Second, although the Cyprus problem was 
de-coupled from the process, a potential rapprochement was expected to have 
positive influences on the Turkish Cypriot side. Turkish Cypriots were anticipated 
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to be encouraged to adopt more flexible positions. Finally, the East-West 
rapprochement, corollary of the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry, appeared to have 
provided Papandreou with an impetus to solve the regional problems through 
cooperative initiatives.150  
On the other hand, Turgut Ozal ascended to power as his party achieved 
“a landslide victory with over 45 percent of the vote …” in the November 1983 
[elections and was aiming to] […] consequent restoration of democracy[; he] thus 
ha[d] a clear mandate to fully implement his reformist program.”151 He was 
reelected in November 1987 and his agenda included mainly economic reforms 
aiming to open and liberalize the country’s economy. Moreover, he sought to 
minimize the military interference in politics. Ozal’s overall strategic vision was 
outlined in a speech at the Turkish parliament when he stated that “the aim of the 
economic liberalization program and our reforms was to facilitate our integration 
into the European Community as a full member.”152 As it has been argued, 
“Ozal’s eagerness for the Davos process to succeed reflects his desire to 
demonstrate Turkey’s political and diplomatic acceptability in Europe.”153 
Additionally, according to Birand the Turkish Prime Minister sought to 
improve bilateral relations with all neighboring countries. While promoting 
economic interdependence with the countries of the region, he held the issue of 
improving the Greek-Turkish relations high at his agenda, and took initiatives that 
could create an atmosphere of trust. The Davos process was also a triumph of 
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Ozal’s personal diplomatic skills, as he maintained that a new datum for the 
Greek-Turkish relations was possible if “… a system of fossilized bureaucracy 
and a rigid [military] establishment,” could be overcome.154 Papandreou and Ozal 
shared similar perceptions in relation with the economic burdens of a protracted 
arms race between the two countries and this served an additional incentive for 
the Davos initiative. Both leaders recognized that it was for their countries’ best 
interest to redirect resources of the budget from defense expenditures to social 
policies promoting welfare. 
Despite the expectations raised in its start, the “Spirit of Davos” proved to 
be short-lived failing to produce long lasting results. As early as 1989, signs of 
reversal were visible and included, inter alia,: Increased numbers of Turkish 
violations of Greek airspace, provocations and pertinent rhetoric related to the 
Muslim minority of Western Thrace,155 and failure of the political committee to 
achieve consensus and develop fresh ideas to the resolution of the issues in 
question. As a final point it must be noted that both sides had there share in 
undermining the process. For example, the Greek government spokesperson 
repeated the Greek position that the only outstanding difference is the 
delimitation of the Continental shelf, while the Turkish foreign Minister 
spokesperson, Inal Batu, reciprocated, claiming the irregularities of the Greek 
                                                 
154 Birand, “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process’: Experiences and Prospects,” 29-31. These 
early initiatives, however, were rebuffed by the Greek government as insincere, since the practice 
of the Turkish government was perceived to be not in compliance with the employed cooperative 
rhetoric. For example, Turkey diplomatically recognized the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TNRC), making it the only state that has done so. The action was explicitly 
condemned by the United Nations Security Council at May 11, 1984, with the adoption of 
Resolution 550 (paragraph 2); for its complete content see  
[http://odsddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/487/80/IMG/NR048780.pdf?OpenElement;] 
Internet, accessed on October 31, 2004. 
155 The treatment of the Muslim minority in Thrace is often referred to as a strained point in 
bilateral relations, as the Turkish government has often accused the Greek government of 
neglecting their economic, educational and religious rights. It is interesting to note, however, that 
the Muslim minority in Thrace is increasing, numbering an estimated 125,000, which is an 
indicator that the community is flourishing. This contrasts sharply with the Greek-Orthodox 
minority in Istanbul that has shrunken to 3,000 members, and in Gokceada (Imvros) and 
Bozcaada (Tenedos) it is practically non existent. See Richard Clogg, A Concise History of 
Greece, Cambridge Concise Histories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 208; see 
also Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, 176-185. 
49 
airspace, militarization of the Aegean Islands and expanded search and rescue 
responsibility, in the Aegean, for Turkey.156 
As discussed above, the process was based on both leaders’ personal 
views and conduct. In the Greek domestic politics sphere Papandreou was 
heavily criticized by the opposition party. This critique broke the general domestic 
consensus that had been in force between the major Greek political parties in 
relation to the Cyprus imbroglio since 1974. The basic premise of the opposition 
politics in Greece against the negotiation process was that Papandreou 
conceded to a rapprochement with Turkey, thereby abandoning the Cyprus 
issue. Moreover, he was criticized for sustaining the procedure without having 
any concrete reciprocal gestures from Turkey.157 This last argument must be 
noted, as it will be reiterated in the future, and major analysts and scholars agree 
upon it. As Pridham observes, the process failed to diffuse amongst the 
populace, and the rapprochement was supported by only 30 per cent of the 
Greek population.158 Papandreou’s illness during the second half of 1988, 
combined with personal as well as financial scandals during the 1989 electoral 
campaign, made the process domestically unsustainable, and it finally collapsed 
during the early 1990’s.159  
Similar was the case of Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, who became 
enmeshed in various political concerns, including internal party opposition. 
Moreover, in a manner parallel to that of the Greek populace issue just 
discussed, 45 percent of the Turkish public rejected any unilateral partial removal 
of Turkish forces from Cyprus.160 Finally, one can argue that although Ozal was 
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pursuing an olive branch policy, he was not substantially abiding by it, conveying 
mixed messages. According to Kramer  
[the] personal flexibility of the Turkish prime minister should not, 
however, be confused with a readiness for a hasty abandonment of 
political positions. On the contrary, Ozal generally has a very 
precise idea of his policy goals […]. This could be seen very clearly 
during the ‘Davos process’ when Ozal refused any moves that went 
beyond the phase of confidence building and could give rise to the 
impression that he might be ready to deal with the substantial 
issues of the Greek-Turkish conflict.161 
Consistent with the above mentioned notion, he was at the same time 
articulating, in moderate terms, confusing rhetoric. As an example, in 1989 he 
fully supported the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas’s suspension of ongoing 
consultation with the Cypriot President Vassiliou and the consequent rejection of 
the de Cuellar plan for the solution of the Cyprus issue.162 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Greek Turkish reconciliation and détente, although difficult due to 
chronic, deeply embedded, controversial feelings and views among the two 
nations, is not an impossible task to achieve. However, such an achievement can 
not be deduced to the simplistic will of two disputants to “bury the hatchet” of war 
and live in peace. The reviewed cases of rapprochement suggest that all three 
attempts at rapprochement had been instrumental in their conception and 
stemmed from divergent starting points. 
All three case studies discussed above have more or less the same 
characteristics. One can argue based on hindsight that the three case studies 
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were initiated when strong and stable governments were leading both countries. 
The Venizelos and Papandreou cases were also based on the personal views of 
both leaders who pursued their policies without co-opting influential 
bureaucracies. The case of the early 1950s, though not a product of personal 
diplomacy, had also a strong incentive taking into account the international and 
regional security status of the era. The common enemy and the common 
beneficiary provided the necessary incentives for the rapprochement. Thus the 
common denominator for the initiation of the rapprochement processes under 
examination is a set of the following attributes: 
Strong leadership in both countries. The cases above suggest that when 
prominent political figures are in power in both countries there are better chances 
for a process to be initiated. These statesmen are eager to take upon themselves 
the burdens of diplomatic discourse and willing to circumvent the political inertia 
of bureaucracy and public opinion. 
Mutually shared or least not opposite national interests. History proves 
that when the national interests of two countries converge, there is an increased 
likelihood for a rapprochement process. Venizelos and Kemal both sought to 
approach one another in a tumultuous era to consolidate their countries’ territorial 
boundaries. Moreover, the Turkish side sought also for financial compensation, a 
pattern that in an analogy will be reiterated in the future. The Soviet empire and 
the  threat it presented to both countries provided them an excellent opportunity 
to enter the Western Countries’ club. Through NATO both Greece and Turkey 
managed to modernize their armed forces and guarantee their territorial integrity 
when both had borders with Warsaw Pact countries. 
In the Papandreou-Ozal case both countries were facing financial issues. 
Notwithstanding the different nature and magnitude of these issues, it was not to 
Greece’s or to Turkey’s benefit to initiate and engage in an armed confrontation. 
Both countries realized that cooperative policies were more beneficial and thus 
the process culminated with the signing of the confidence building measures 
agreement. 
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The dissolution of the Greek Turkish rapprochements on the other hand, is 
equally explainable. Bureaucracies based on the own ill-posited perceptions and 
mixed messages constitute a general pattern. Moreover, the divergence of 
national interests instigated by endogenous dynamics further contributes to the 
erosion of the processes. All the above case studies were initiated in a top down 
approach and collapsed when the leaders who incepted and implemented them 
disappeared from the political landscape; or when influential parts of state actors 
generally in discord with the process were given the opportunity to inflict damage 
in the procedure, as they feel threatened from it. However, the most recent case 
of Greek-Turkish rapprochement that will be examined in the following chapter 
bears at least one significant difference with those already scrutinized; it gained 
impetus by spontaneous reaction to a physical catastrophe that hit both countries 


























IV. THE PERIOD OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS: 1999-2004 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 [A]t crucial moments, at turning points in history, when factors 
appear more or less equally balanced, chance, individuals and their 
decisions […] can determine the course of history.163 
This chapter will examine the latest of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
efforts initiated in 1999 and anticipated to reach its first major milestone in 
December 2004. In particular, on December 17, 2004 the EU Council will 
evaluate the recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress 
for accession to the Union. The estimate and all reports from scholars, 
politicians, analysts and technocrats advocate that the EU Council will set the 
long awaited staring date of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey 
sometime in 2005. This will most probably be the initiation of a process that is 
anticipated to be protracted and probably extend beyond the first decade of the 
21st century. 
The 1999 initiative did not occur in a vacuum; a series of events preceded 
it. These events, as well as politics and statesmen in both countries, provided the 
necessary preconditions and set the political landscape for the reconciliation. 
This chapter will provide in its first part a brief background of the major pertinent 
events in the aftermath of the 1996 Imia crisis.164 These events are accounted as 
the precursors of the rapprochement under discussion. In a stunning similarity, 
                                                 
 163 Iaiah Berlin, quoted in Ramin Jahanbegloo, “Philosophy and Life: An Interview,” New 
York Review of Books, 39, no. 10 (May 28, 1992), 51 as cited in John Lamberton Harper, 
American Visions of Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 
164 During this crisis the two countries came at the brink of war once again. The crisis was 
de-escalated only after high U.S. official mediation that included President Clinton. For a crisis 
summary and assessment see “AEGEAN SEA IV,” International Crisis Behavior (ICB) online, 
available from [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb;] Internet, accessed on November 8, 2004. See 
also Carol Migdalovitz, Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis, Congressional Research 
Servise Report for Congress, The library of Congress,1996, available from  
[http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Mon+Nov++8+22:46:56+PST+2004/SIRSI/0/518/0/CRS
96-140F.pdf/Content/1?new_gateway_db=HYPERION;] Internet, accessed on November 8, 
2004. The qualitative difference of the specific crisis from others in the past is that Turkey 
advanced a novel area of dispute, challenging the status quo in the form of the so called “grey 
zones.” Coining that term, Turkey asserted that numerous islands not mentioned explicitly by 
name  in the pertinent treaties are deemed to fall under this category. 
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as in 1987 both countries sought to circumvent their differences and reach once 
more a point where channels of communication could be reestablished. The 
following chapter will continue with a reference to the events and conditions that 
actually spurred the current reconciliation. Finally, the third section of the chapter 
will examine developments in economic and defense fields, the impact of the 
European Union, the Cyprus issue, and cooperation at the political level. 
Specifically on the last issue, the study will provide a reference to the so-called 
“high politics” or areas of increased antagonism between the two neighboring 
countries. 
  
B. THE PRE-EARTHQUAKE (1999) PERIOD 
1. The Madrid Declaration and the 1997 Crete Meeting 
In July 1997 Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and his Turkish 
counterpart, Suleyman Demirel, reached an accord, a.k.a. the Madrid 
Declaration, at the margins of the Madrid NATO Summit. The U.S., and in 
particular Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State, exerted their 
influence for this accord. The Madrid Declaration contained stipulations in a form 
of norms and principles meant to govern the bilateral relations of the signatories. 
In a way the Madrid text provided a well established roadmap to reduce tension 
in the Aegean. The qualitative differences of the Madrid Declaration are 
incorporated in the following three principles:  
 [R]espect of each other’s legitimate and vital interests and 
concerns in the Aegean; 
 a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of 
mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from 
misunderstanding; 
 a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on 
mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force.165 
 
                                                 
165 Embassy of Greece, Press office, Simitis-Demirel meeting leads to joint communiqué on 
Greek-Turkish relations, Washington, D.C.,  July 9, 1997, available from  
[http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=255&article=15
20;] Internet, accessed on October 9, 2004.   
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Hence, Greece made a reconciliatory gesture towards Turkey by 
recognizing the latter’s “vital interests” in the Aegean, and refraining from 
exercising its right to the 12 nautical mile limit, as mentioned above. On the other 
hand, the obligations undertaken by Turkey - third principle, given the 1995 
casus belli threat166 - is something that a country as a member of the United 
Nations is obliged to comply with under the U.N. Chapter.167 As a final point it is 
imperative to note that while many consider that the Madrid agreement was the 
precursor of the present reconciliation process, this is not exactly true. Madrid 
occurred in the aftermath of the Imia crisis and it must be accounted in that 
context.  
As a follow on of the Madrid NATO Summit, Prime Ministers Simitis and 
Yilmaz met in Crete during the November 1997 Balkan countries conference. 
The conference was a Greek government’s initiative conceived to promote 
regional cooperation, peace and security. However, the meeting did not produce 
any breakthrough in reducing tensions between the two countries. It has been 
argued “[t]he Simitis-Yilmaz meeting in Crete revealed the crux of the Greek-
Turkish problems and differences.”168 Like the 1987 period, mixed messages 
were conveyed, with prominent examples, statements of Turkish Prime Minister 
Yilmaz. In December 1997 he declared that Ankara will "intensify integration" 
with the Turkish Cypriots in the north, a step that clearly implied the threat of 
                                                 
166 Further analysis in the section that follows in the present chapter. 
167 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, stipulates that  
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Ch. 1, Article 2, available from 
[http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/;] Internet, accessed on  October  12, 2004.  
168 Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International 
Law, 101-102.  
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annexation.169 Furthermore, in April 1998, equating Turkey with the Ottoman 
Empire, Yilmaz asserted that “Greece has expanded its territory 400 percent at 
the expense of Turkey since it’s establishment.”170 
 
2. The Ocalan Case and the Kosovo Imbroglio 
Two distinct events mark this period further, serving as turning points that 
lead to the Greek-Turkish ongoing rapprochement. These are the arrest of 
Abdullach Ocalan, leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency, and 
the NATO Kosovo air campaign undertaken to stop the ethnic cleansing of the 
Albanian population by Serbs. Despite the fact that these events are totally 
diverse this thesis will exhibit their role in the process. The role of the first 
stemmed from its repercussions in Greek domestic policies and the second 
galvanized the minds of the Turkish policy makers towards the rapprochement. 
In February 1999 Ocalan was arrested in Kenya after an adventurous 
journey in Europe and Russia, during which he attempted to settle as a political 
refugee. The entanglement of Greek political and diplomatic authorities in the 
arrest was heavily reproached by Turkish leadership. Ocalan having passed 
through Greece, was transported in the Greek Embassy in Kenya were he was 
                                                 
169 Kelly Couturier, "Ankara Ready to Sever European Ties; Angered by EU Rejection, 
Turkish Leader Threatens Cyprus Peace Effort," The Washington Post, December 15 1997. The 
statement was made in the wake of the Turkish failure to be admitted to the list of candidate 
states at the next round of accession negotiations in the December 1997 EU summit meeting in 
Luxembourg. The statements of the Turkish president were complemented by claims of the 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem that this would happen “whenever EU began admission talks 
with the Cyprus government,” see Giannes Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, Greece the Modern 
Sequel: From 1831 to the Present, (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 325. 
170 As quoted in Thanos Veremis, “The Protracted Crisis,” in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios 
Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Brassey's, 2001), 47. 
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arrested.171 The rhetoric reached points of hyperbole. The Turkish President 
Demirel argued that 
…Greece's continuing support to PKK terrorist organization 
represents nothing but a grave violation of international law […] 
Greece has proven that it does not belong to the civilized world. 
Accordingly, it should be put on the list of the countries supporting 
terrorism and harboring terrorists. Such a country can only be 
defined as a "rogue state.172 
What is important for this study is that the domestic vibrations of the 
Ocalan affair in Greece forced Foreign Minister Pangalos to resign from office. 
Pangalos was considered by many (domestically and abroad) as an intelligent, 
capable, but hawkish figure of the Greek foreign policy.173 Prime Minister Simitis 
appointed as head of the Greek diplomacy the more judicious and certainly more 
moderate Alternate Foreign Minister George Papandreou, the elder son of the 
late Andreas Papandreou. The appointment of Papandreou marked a milestone 
                                                 
171 Turkey had often accused Greece of supporting the PKK separatist insurgency, obviously 
based on the notion that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” To that extent in 1996 Elekdağ, 
argued in the Turkish Foreign Minister’s official publication that Turkey’s ational security strategy 
should be oriented towards a “two-and-a-half campaigns” in order to deter “Greece and Syria, 
who have claims on Turkey's vital interests and territory.” According to Elekdağ the ½ is 
represented by the PKK insurgency that Greece and Syria are supporting. For a further analysis 
see Sükrü Elekdağ, "2 1/2 War Strategy," Perceptions- Journal of International Affairs Vol. III, no. 
4 (March-May 1996)., available from [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i1/default.htm;] 
Internet, accessed on October 12, 2004. 
172 ”President Demirel Answering to Question Regarding Greek Support to PKK Terrorism,” 
February, 22 1999, Turkish Foreign Ministry Publications, Greece and PKK Terrorism, Annex VIII, 
available from [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh05/17.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 12, 
2004.  As a result of rising tensions, the visa exemption for Greek tourists dating back to the Ozal 
era was cancelled, and more importantly the private sector Turkish-Greek business agreements 
were abandoned. See  Akiman Nachmani, “What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-
Greek Relations,” in Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kirisci, Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power, (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 76. 
173 “Greek Ministers Quit over Ocalan,” BBC News-Europe, 18 February 1999, available 
from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/281815.stm;] Internet, accessed on October 12, 
2004. 
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for the process since the Turkish side would find in his face someone willing to 
curb Greek foreign policy towards Turkey and initiate a new era.174 
In both countries roughly at the same period the policy makers were 
alarmed with the incidents in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The fear of the 
consequences from a potential spill over of the conflict was evident. Large 
numbers of ethnic Albanian refugees fled Kosovo under the fear of carnage by 
the Milocevic regime. NATO exhibited its determination to put an end to the ethic 
cleansing and in April 1999 initiated an air campaign which lasted about 11 
weeks. As Heraklides notes “[i]t was not until this event that the two governments 
made a decisive entry as clear supporters of détente. The common fear of 
destabilization in the region and, most of all, the threat of the possibility of 
change of boundaries in the vicinity by threat or use of force, intensified the 
contacts between the two worried sides.”175 In this wake the two foreign 
ministers, in June 1999 exchanged a series of letters that emphasized the 
necessity of improvement of bilateral relations.  
Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister who is credited with having 
initiated the process, in a letter to his Greek counterpart stressed the 
precondition for improved relations and cooperation between the two countries. 
In a remarkable parallel to Inonu’s response to Venizelos correspondence in 
1930, Cem’s letter reads in part:  
…our initial step should be to address the problem of what is 
perceived in Turkey as links that exist in Greece with terrorist 
organizations and their systematic encouragement. This is a matter 
of crucial importance for us and recent events have made it 
imperative that this issue be handled in an explicit manner and at 
the bilateral level between our two countries… I further suggest that 
                                                 
174 There is a general consensus among analysts that the replacement of Foreign Minister 
Pangalos served as one of the catalysts for the improvement of bilateral relations. See Mumtaz 
Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, The 
Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 43; see also Gulden 
Ayman, “Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek 
Case,” in Aydin and Ifantis, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean, 232-
233; see also Stephen F. Larrabee, “Security in the Eastern Mediterranean,” in Keridis and 
Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, 236-237. 
175 Alexis Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation,” 
in Aydin and Ifantis, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean, 75. 
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parallel to the signing and implementation of such an agreement, 
we could also initiate a plan for reconciliation.176  
Papandreou responded by suggesting that cooperation could 
potentially be expanded in a wide variety of issues. In his letter 
Papandreou noted that: 
…I would like to welcome the expression of willingness from your 
side to improve our bilateral relations. This is also the sincere wish 
of the Greek side. Greece is willing to address the issues in our 
relations within the framework of International Law and Treaties. I 
strongly believe that we must adopt a realistic approach which will 
allow outstanding issues to be dealt with in sequence creating thus 
both a strengthening sense of confidence in our relations and a 
perspective of further steps along the way […]. In parallel, we could 
also envisage resuming dialogue on issues, many of which we 
have attempted to deal with in the past. Cooperation in several 
fields of mutual interest such as culture, tourism, environment, 
crime, economic cooperation and ecological problems should be 
amongst the topics of our talks.177  
Closer scrutiny of the exchanged correspondence makes evident that 
Papandreou, instead of rebuffing the precondition set by Cem,178 was prepared 
to engage in a cooperative effort which was planed well in advance. This fact is 
confirmed by Heraklides who asserts that “…Papandreou had prepared the 
ground for the thaw in Greek foreign ministry (not without difficulty) well before 
the exchange of letters.”179 The approach was intended to distinguish the so 
called “low politics,” in which the two countries could proceed in building an 
atmosphere of cooperation, and mutual trust while initially isolating “high politics” 
issues where the positions of the two countries diverge. 
 
                                                 
176 Letter from Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George 
Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, Ankara, 24 May 1999, available from 
[http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c1.htm;] Interenet, accessed on November 1, 2004.  
177 Letter from Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr 
Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Athens, 25 June 1999, available from 
[http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c2.htm;] Internet, accessed on November 1, 2004.  
178 It must be noted that Athens vehemently opposed the allegations that supported the 
activities of PKK, or that harbored terrorists. 
179 Heraclides’ interview with officials in the Greek Foreign Ministry, see Heraclides, “The 
Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation,” p. 91 endnote 37. 
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C. EARTHQUAKE DIPLOMACY  
 An unpredictable event and the spontaneous reaction of the populace 
infused new impetus to the novel Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In August 1999 
a devastating earthquake occurred in Turkey. Greece was among the first 
countries to respond to the catastrophe, dispatching search and rescue teams, 
as well as materiel support for the victims of the earthquake. One month later a 
less destructive earthquake occurred in Athens. Turkey reciprocated, responding 
in an analogous manner, dispatching rescue teams to assist the Greeks in their 
earthquake plight.180 The rapid and generous mutual support in time of 
humanitarian crisis had an important psychological effect among the populace. It 
helped towards gradually altering each other’s negative perspectives 
accumulated and reinforced over the years. Moreover, it created fertile ground for 
the emergence of a strong feeling of solidarity among the Greek and Turkish 
peoples. 
This tendency was present in the two countries’ news media that in 
previous occasions had fueled nationalistic passions and infused tensions. A 
Greek newspaper paraphrasing President’s Kennedy speech in Berlin stated in 
its front page that “[w]e are all Turks.”181 In a parallel manner Turkish 
newspapers initiated a self questioning exercise about the events of 1955. For 
example Haluk Sakin wrote: “The events of 6-7 September [of 1955] were the 
beginning of a bad period of our history….”182 
The catastrophic events of August-September and the feelings of 
sympathy along the coastlines of the Aegean were the necessary conduit to 
extend the rapprochement to the population. Moreover, it provided the necessary 
                                                 
180 Larrabee and Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 84-85. 
 181 Ta Nea, August 20, 1999 quoted Ayten Gundoglu, "Identities in question: Greek-Turkish 
Relations in a Period of Transformation?," Middle East Review of International Affaires, Vol. 5, 
no. 1 (March 2001): 5. 
182 Haluk Sahin, “Turkiye ile Yunanistan [Turkey and Greece],” Hurriyet, September 11, 1999 
as quoted in Faruk Sonmezoglu and Gulden Ayman, “The Roots of Conflict and the Dynamics of 
Change in Turkish-Greek Relations,” in Christos  Kollias and Gulay Gunluk-Sensen, Greece and 
Turkey in the 21st Centuty: Conflict or Cooperation, A political Economy Perspective, (New  York: 
Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2003), 85. 
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leverage for foreign policy decision makers. The momentum provided sustained 
domestic cover for diplomatic initiatives, which are since known with the term 
“Earthquake” or “seismic” Diplomacy. This cover ultimately helped in insulating 
the initiatives from possible domestic criticism that hindered previous attempts, 
as already mentioned. This is a qualitative difference that the latest process has 
over its earlier counterparts. In other words, while for example the reconciliation 
process of the late 1980s was seen as a procedure conducted mainly on the 
political plane, the late 1990s acquired another actor in the face of the two 
peoples. 
The result was that the two Foreign Ministers utilized the earthquake 
menace and the following impulsive attitudes of their peoples as a precursor to 
build further their personal relationship and extend it to diplomacy. In a 
remarkably similar manner like past processes, both statesmen used their 
personal influences and conducted a short of personal diplomacy skirting round 
bureaucratic impediments.183  
In this spirit, Papandreou and Cem agreed upon establishing six working 
groups to explore the possibility of cooperation and agreement in the areas 
proposed by Papandreou’s letter. The efforts culminated with the reciprocal visits 
of Papandreou to Ankara in January 2000 and Cem’s, to Athens in February 
2000. During these rather symbolic visits nine agreements were signed on the 
“low politics issues,” which include: 
 Cooperation in the field of Tourism 
 Economic Cooperation 
 Cooperation in Science and Technology 
 Maritime Transport  
 Cultural Cooperation  
                                                 
183 Indicative is the assessment made two years later by the former U.S. ambassador to 
Greece, Nicolas Burns "What Cem and Papandreou were able to achieve has catapulted their 
countries' relations forward,[…] They made a strategic decision that they don't want to be 
enemies and they don't want to spend the next 25 to 30 years in an arms race. They made a 
strategic decision to pursue rapprochement…,” as quoted in Catherine Collins, "Foreign Ministers' 
Expanded Worldview links Turkey, Greece," The Chicago Tribune, January 26, 2001, available 
from[http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=906&language=0;] 
Internet, accessed on October 21, 2004. 
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 Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs 
Administrations  
 Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
 Cooperation on Environmental Protection  
 Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, 
illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration.184  
What is very interesting is that the working groups that had been set up to 
prepare the aforementioned agreements did not dissolve once their task was 
completed. Instead they continued overseeing implementation, in periodic 
meetings in an ongoing consultation process.185 In itself this is of considerable 
value since it promotes understanding between the two countries as well as the 
formerly nonexistent transgovermental cooperation. 
 
D. POST EARTHQUAKE BILATERAL RELATIONS 
1. Development of Economic Relations 
The unexpected improvement of Greek-Turkish relations combined with 
the expressed will of the governments to normalize relations, as demonstrated 
with the signed agreements, opened new doors of communication between the 
two countries. It paved the way for the mobilization of various forces in the form 
of two-track diplomacy.186 The main driving force was the Greek-Turkish 
Business Partnership Council. This council resumed operations, in September 
1999 (10 years since its 1989 deactivation) and organized workgroups in order to 
further develop relation and cooperation between the Greek–Turkish business 
                                                 
184 See “Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, available from  
[http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html;] Internet, 
accessed on October 12, 2004.  
185 Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation,” 78-79. 
186 Two Track diplomacy is defined as “an informal interaction between influential members 
of opposing groups. Its aim is to define and examine psychological impediments to the peace 
process, to develop strategies to influence public opinion, and to organize resources in ways 
favorable to the resolution of conflict.” See Volkan and Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in 
Conflict, p. 214 footnote 269.  
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communities. As a result significant numbers of professional, social and business 
groups were mobilized promoting peace between the two countries.187 
The direct corollary was the initiation of significant projects in both 
countries. It is noteworthy that Greek-Turkish business exchanges, as early as 
the year 2000, reached approximately the amount of $1 billion, whereas, in 1995 
they were confined to $411 million.188 In addition, Greek exports to Turkey rose 
significantly to $592.1 million in 2000, while in 1994 were $168.7 million. Turkey's 
exports to Greece rose by 52.8 % in 2003 to $902.64 million, while Greek exports 
to Turkey rose 36.16 percent to $425.45 million. Bilateral trade exceeded $1.3 
billion in 2003, up 39.9 % from the previous year. Several measures accounted 
for such increase, including the bilateral ''Agreement on the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation'' signed in Ankara in December 2003.189 Moreover, bilateral trade is 
expected to reach $5 billion by the year 2005 an unthinkable figure some years 
ago.190 The trend and the volume of the bilateral trade since the initiation of the 







                                                 
187 Turkish Daily News, Ankara, October 19, 1999 available from 
[http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/10_14_99/econ.htm#e1;] Internet, accessed on 
October 21, 2004. 
188 Nachmani, “What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations,” 88.  
189 “Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 190 For further elaborate analysis of the Greek-Turkish economic coopeartion see Panagiotis 
Liargovas, “The Economic Imperative: Procepects for Trade Intergration and Business 
Intergration,“ in Aydin and Ifantis, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean, 
145-161. 
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Table 1.   Greek-Turkish bilateral trade (million $).191 
 
The second area which reflects the improvement of bilateral economic 
interdependence is the tourist industry. Since expansion of economic cooperation 
requires stabilized relations, the tourist industry has begun to flourish. As 
Ioakeimidis argues “it was the first time that the two countries’ tourist circles 
seemed willing to resist so actively to any potential deterioration in Greek-Turkish 
relations.”192 Greek and Turkish tourist agencies signed a pertinent "protocol of 
cooperation,” and organized an enormous number of joint programs that 
increased significantly the number of tourists in both countries. The total number 
of Greek tourists visiting Turkey in 2003 was 393,397, an increase of 40.48% 
over 2002. Moreover, the incremental tendency in the number of visitors in 
Turkey was sustained notwithstanding the November 2003 terrorist attacks in 
Istanbul. Indicative of the trend is that since 2001 the total number of Greek 
visitors in Turkey has almost doubled. On the other hand the total of Turkish 
tourists visiting Greece has increased by more than 20% between the years 2001 
and 2002, as depicted in tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
                                                 
191 Table by the author, data derived from Dionisis Protopapas, Turkey: Economy, 
Investment, Trade (Istanbul: Cusultant General of Greece, May 2004), available from 
[http://www.eber.gr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=651&sid=aca0a324438c2f80f4b7747d94ff22a0;] 
Internet, accessed on November 1, 2004. 
192 Panayiotis Ioakeimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities 
Versus Institutions,” in Theodoros Couloumbis et al. eds., The Foreign Policies of the European 
Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (London, UK: Mc Millan 
Press, 1999), 157. 
      
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Rate of 
 Change % 
as of Mar-04 
Greek Imports 335.4 543.9 395 347.8 528.4 51.93% 
Greek Exports 363.3 388.4 492 592.1 870.1 46.79% 
Trade Volume 698.7 932.3 887 939.9 1,398.50 39.87% 
Trade Balance 
for Greece -27.9 155.5 -97 -244.3 -341.7 39.87% 
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2001 10,621 12,832 11,034 18,687 15,284 18,687 20,648 27,803 19,726 15,211 13,389 13,146 197,258  
2002 7,951 14,953 23,002 16,975 27,301 22,059 24,388 34,886 25,185 31,812 24,969 26,552 280,033 41.96% 
2003 19,075 16,920 20,876 25,870 26,080 34,233 39,175 61,178 39,562 51,699 30,167 28,366 393,397 40.48% 
Table 2.   Greek Tourists visiting Turkey. 
 
 
 2001 2002 
Rate of 
Change 
Total 114,354 139,018 21.57% 
January 3,280 4,158 26.77% 
February 4,329 5,703 31.74% 
March 8,422 5,351 -36.46% 
April 5,376 6,816 26.79% 
May 6,502 7,197 10.69% 
June 9,103 17,276 89.78% 
July 15,521 28,574 84.10% 
August 28,010 27,855 -0.55% 
September 14,705 14,174 -3.61% 
October 8,499 9,176 7.97% 
November 5,871 6,456 9.96% 
December 4,737 6,282 32.64% 
Table 3.   Turkish Tourists visiting Greece.193 
 
As a corollary of the ongoing amelioration of tensions in bilateral relations, 
the interdependence of the two countries in all segments of economic activity has 
expanded over the last four years. The once nonexistent economic linkages are 
now more than tangible and continuously growing. In the field of transportation 
infrastructure, the building of the Egnatia Highway, a 680-kilometers modern 
motorway that cuts across the mountainous backbone of northern Greece, will 
link the Black with the Adriatic Sea.  
In the energy field, in January 2000, a Greek-Turkish-U.S. consortium 
announced plans for the construction of a gas-fired power plant in Greece. The 
plant will be capable of reaching a peak of 600 MW the excess of which will be 
exported to Turkey. Moreover, in March 2002, the two countries signed a bilateral 
agreement for an electricity grid connecting the nations' power along the Greek-
                                                 
193 Both tables by author, data derived from Protopapas, Turkey: Economy, Investment, 
Trade. 
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Turkish border to be in operation by 2006.194 As a final point the two countries 
sought and have concluded in March 2002 a $300 million agreement for the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline that will feed the energy market in Greece. 
At a later stage natural gas will be transported through the pipeline and will be 
exported to the cover expanding energy needs of Europe.195 
 
2. Defense Issues and NATO  
Both Greece and Turkey have long been engaged in a protracted arms 
race,196 which is illustrated in Table 4. This was the direct corollary of the 
“security dilemma” operating on both sides of the Aegean. Consequently both 
countries. at least for the past twenty years, have had two of the highest defense 












Table 4.   Greek and Turkish Military Expenditures.197 
                                                 
194 “Country Analysis Briefs: Greece,” Energy Information Administration, October 2004, 
available from [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/greece.html#elec;] Internet, accessed on 
October 22, 2004.   
195 "US Department of State: Turkey and Greece sign natural gas pipeline agreement," M2 
Presswire, December 29, 2003, available from  
[http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet, accessed on October 22, 2004. 
196 The literature on the subject of whether or not bilateral defense expenditures constitute 
an arms race, is abundant. Generally there is a consensus that “Greek defense spending is not 
autonomous and but rather its size depends on the size of Turkish military expenditure to a larger 
extent than Turkish military expenditure depends on Greek defense spending.” See Christos 
Kollias and Paleologou Suzanna-Maria, "Is There a Greek-Turkish Arms Race? Some Further 
Empirical Results from CausalityTests," Defence and Peace Economics vol. 13, no. 4, 327. 
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Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available from 
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Table 5.   NATO Members’ Defense Expenditures.198 
 
At the behest of the rapprochement process Greece initiated a series of 
cooperative gestures in defense issues, abandoning longstanding policies. In the 
beginning of April 2001 Greece terminated by decree the state of war and the 
mobilization of the armed forces dating from the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 
In the field of budget cuts Greece initiated and Turkey followed shortly a series of 
expenditure cuts. One prominent example is that Greece deferred the 
procurement of 60 fourth generation fighter aircrafts. Additionally Greece reduced 
major defense procurement programs, thus accomplishing total savings of $4.4 
billion. These savings were reflected in the five-year short-term procurement 
planning which after the Imia crisis had a tendency to increase on a yearly basis. 
The aforementioned arms procurement cutbacks were reciprocated by Turkey. 
During the same month, the Turkish government announced suspending arms 
procurement worth $19.5 billion.199  
                                                 
198 Table by author, data (percentage of GDP) derived from NATO handbook, chapter 9, 
Financial control, available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb090804.htm;] 
Internet, accessed on November 11, 2004. 
199Andrew Borowiec, "Greek cutbacks ease military tensions," The Washington Times, April 
10, 2001, available from [http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet, accessed 
on November 11, 2004. 
68 
Moreover, Defense Minister Akis Tsochantzopoulos set forth a plan for the 
transformation of the armed forces and the reduction of their manpower from 
140,000 to 90,000.200 In 2003, Greek Defense Minister Papantoniou expressed 
the new goal of reducing arms expenditure from 4.9% of GDP and stabilize it to 
an average of 2.7%, for the period 2010-2015.201 The issue was further pursued 
in 2004 by the new Karamanlis conservative government. On May 2004, the 
Defense ministers of Greece and Turkey, Spiliotopoulos and Gonul, announced 
their intention to reduce defense spending by an average of 5% each year, 
implementing a pre-election decision by Prime Ministers Karamanlis and 
Erdogan.202 
The announced arms expenditure reduction proposals more or less follow 
a reciprocal pattern between the two countries. The majority of the analysts point 
out that the magnitude of the announced reductions from the beginning has been 
primarily dictated by economic considerations for both countries.203 However, 
such cooperation also demonstrates a plausible effort to escape from the typical 
Greek-Turkish arms race that is on going for more almost three decades. 
In an effort to alleviate mutual suspicion, on October 2000 Greece and 
Turkey agreed to proceed further and implement a set of Confidence Building 
                                                 
200 Athanasios Tsochantzopoulos, Interview in Turkish Daily News, March 25, 2001, 
available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_25_01/for.htm;] Internet, 
accessed on October 7, 2004. 




accessed on October 25, 2004. 
202 Patrick Quinn, "Leaders of Greece and Turkey had agreed to reduce defense spending 
before taking office," Associated Press, September 14, 2004, available from [http://80-web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet, accessed on October 27, 2004. 
203 For Turkey the underlying cause appears to be the INF directives after the 2001 
economic crisis. For Greece two reasons are cited, first, the fear that the high defense budget 
would undermine the commitments for economic stability and growth potential in the context of 
euro-zone, and second, the unexpected cost for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games. See 
Panagiotis Tsakonas, "Turkey's Post Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus 
Issue," Turkish Studies vol. 2, no. 2 (Autumn 2001), 17-18, and Thanos P. Dokos “Tension 
Reduction and Confidence Building Mesures in the Aegean,” in Aydin and Ifantis, Turkish-Greek 
Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean, 127. See also, Panagiotis J. Tsakonas and 
Thanos P. Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century: A view from 
Athens,” in Martin and Keridis, The Future of Turkish foreign policy, 109 footnote 19.. 
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Measures (CBMs). In this context it was agreed that the implementation of the 
CBMs would be on two levels: at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Directors 
level, and within NATO under the auspices of Secretary General. 
At the Political Directors Level, the two officials agreed on eight CBMs. 
These are the establishment of direct communication channels at the Foreign 
Ministry level, the exchange of invitations to attend large-scale military exercise, 
the exchange of views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the activities of International 
Organizations relating to military matters in the margins of the meetings of 
International Organizations, the cooperation for pollution prevention of Evros 
river, the establishment of a direct phone line between the two Ministers of 
Defense, the exchange of visits between General Staff Officers, exchange of 
visits of students of the military academies  and the establishment of 
telemedicine connection between military hospitals.204 
In 2003 the two countries elaborated on a series of CBMs under the 
auspices of NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson. These include the 
following: 
 Mutual notification of exercise schedules. 
 Cooperation between the respective National Defense 
Colleges, in the field of science and on subjects of mutual 
interest, such as NATO issues, military doctrines, crisis 
management, peacekeeping, natural disasters, 
environmental issues and others. 
 Exchange of military personnel for training purposes in the 
PfP Training Centers of the two countries. in Kilkis, and in 
Ankara.205 
As already mentioned both countries within the Alliance, opted a strategy 
of cross veto employment to the respective defense chapters. The first major 
breakthrough was achieved in 1999, when the two countries implemented the 
new (at the time) command structure. Under the rearrangement two Joint Sub-
                                                 
204 “Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process),” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
205 “Statement by the Secretary General of NATO,” NATO Press Releases. July 23, 2003, 
available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-087e.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 
24, 2004  
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Regional Headquarters were established in Larissa (with Greek Commanding 
officer and Turkish Chief of Staff and Izmir (with Turkish Commanding Officer 
and Greek Chief of Staff).206 The cooperative paradigm in the context of the 
Atlantic Alliance was taken a step further by Greece during the 2002 Prague 
Summit. Greece did not veto a relevant decision of the Alliance to adapt a new 
streamlined and flexible Command structure. With this new structure Turkey 
retains an operational headquarters functioning as one of the three component 
commands of Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples), while Greece has no 
analogous command. This constitutes an additional evidence of the shift in Greek 
policy towards Turkey. 
At the operational level cooperative relations have been also initiated. In 
2000 both countries participated in the Alliance exercise “Dynamic Mix” that 
marked the first, after several decades, deployment of Turkish troops and fighter 
aircrafts in Greece as part of the NATO force.207 Moreover an example of 
excellent cooperation between Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 6 in 
Izmir, Turkey208 and CAOC 7 in Larissa Greece occurred, in March 2003. A 
hijacked Turkish Airbus 310, was smoothly handed over when the plane reached 
the international airspace over the Aegean Sea, and successfully landed in 
Athens International Airport escorted by Hellenic fighters.209 
 
 
                                                 
206 This Command Structure was deactivated in March 2004. For more information on these 
archival arrangements see “Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe,” AFSOUTH 
Fact sheets, April 13, 2004, available from  
[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/RHQAFSOUTH.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 28, 
2004. 
207 For more information see, “Exercise Dynamic Mix-2000,” AFSOUTH, available from 
[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/Exercises/Mix00.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 28, 2004. 
208 “Combined Air Operations Center 6,” AFSOUTH Fact sheets September 2, 2003, 
available from [http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/NATOTurkey/CAOC6Factsheet.htm;] 
Internet October 28, 2004. 
209 “Turkish plane hijacker surrenders,” CNN, March 28, 2003, available from 
[http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/28/turkey.hijack/;] Internet; accessed on October 28 
2004. 
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3. The European Union Factor 
Greece became an associate member of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1962 and full member in 1981. Turkey on the other hand 
had been an associate member since 1963 and applied for full membership in 
1987. Its application that time was declined primarily due to economic and 
political reasons.  
Greek foreign policy of the 1981-1990 period utilized EEC membership 
both as a diplomatic lever and as a restraining mechanism in its bilateral relations 
with Turkey. For Greece a bipartisan policy was adopted based on a stance of 
“conditionality.” In other words Greece used its membership as a lever designed 
to convince Turkey that the Turkish-EEC relations could not be normalized 
unless the Cyprus question was resolved.210  
In the early 1990s and especially under the Simitis government Greece 
reoriented its European politics.211 It emphasized the fact that she was the only 
Balkan state being a member of the two European pillars: the defensive (NATO) 
and the political (EU). Greece realized that this simultaneous membership could 
be used to in a multidimensional policy towards the other Balkan countries, as 
well as towards the EU and NATO. Greek foreign policy opted to put forward the 
issues between the two countries in the EU where political conditions are not 
dominated by any country acting as “primus inter pares.” To that extent one can 
plausibly assert that the stance of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey’s transformed. The 
new policy often declared as the European option moved gradually from a 
strategy of “conditional sanctions” towards one of “conditional rewards”212 and 
included two shifts. 
                                                 
 210 Theodore A. Couloumbis, “Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities,” in Couloumbis, 
Kariotis, and Bellou, Greece in the Twentieth Century, 34-35. 
211 Costas Simitis succeed Andreas Papandreou as leader of the socialist pasty (PASOK) in 
1996. His “modernization” clause called for a reform process both within the party as well as all 
aspects of the society. Moreover, “Simitis came to symbolize European normalcy as opposed to 
Greek exeptionalism.” See Dimitris Keridis, “Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy: Greek 
Policy Towards Turkey,” in Keridis and Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of 
Globalization, 7-8. 
212 Couloumbis and Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic 
Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach," 11. 
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The first shift occurred in March 1995 when Greece lifted its objections to 
the much-anticipated customs union between Turkey and the EU, and the 
associated financial protocol. Turkey was the first country in the Union’s history 
to form such a customs union without becoming an EU member first. This policy 
shift did not improve bilateral relations, as the agreement was associated with 
EUs’ consent to begin accession talks with Cyprus in 1998213 It should be noted 
at this point that Greek-Turkish relations of that era did not remain stable. On the 
contrary, they were further exacerbated with the ratification of UNCLOS III by the 
Greek parliament and the reciprocal Turkish decree containing the casus belli 
clause in 1995, and by the Imia crisis early in 1996.  
Relations between the EU and Turkey were further strained after the 1997 
Luxemburg Summit. Turkey was not included in the enlargement process, but 
was given a special status which included an extended perspective of full 
membership. Turkey was to follow a special “European Strategy” and not a pre-
accession one. On the other hand, the “inclusion of Cyprus created [a] deep 
feeling of resentment [on the Turks].” Cyprus was included in the so-called “fast 
track” in which accession negotiations would begin in the near future. As Erlap 
asserts, “[T]he Turkish government regarded the Luxemburg decisions as 
discriminatory and politicized, and made under the influence of Greece…Ankara 
thought that this was a clear sign that the EU was taking the Greek side on the 
Cyprus issue and acting under the Greek influence.” 214  
The second and most spectacular shift occurred in December 1999, 
during the Helsinki European Council. During the summit that took key decisions 
on the Union’s forthcoming enlargement, Greece lifted its longstanding veto 
pertinent to Turkey’s accession. The corollary was that the summit granted 
                                                 
213 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, ( 235-236. For the financial part see Costas 
Melakopides, “Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement,” 
Occasional Paper, (Athens: ELIAMEP,2002),  20 available from 
[http://www.eliamep.gr/_admin/upload_publication/324_1en_occ.PDF;] Internet, accessed on 
October 29, 2004. It must be pointed out however, that Greece “[i]n all EU forums, had stalled the 
aid money to Turkey, an amount that by summer 1999 reached $500 million,” see Nachmani, 
“What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations,” 84. 
214 Attila Eralp, “Turkey and The European Union,” in Martin and Keridis, The Future of 
Turkish foreign policy, 71-72. 
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Turkey EU candidate status,215 accompanied with the approval of a $600 million 
financial protocol. This major shift in Greece’s strategic approach toward Turkey, 
was according to Foreign Minister George Papandreou the “…culmination of the 
new phase in Greek foreign policy.”216 The aforementioned gesture was part of 
the initiated “conditional rewards” policy. The aim was to signal Turkey that 
cooperation is more attractive and rewarding than competition. The new rationale 
shifted from isolating to engaging Turkey in a careful process aiming to ultimately 
integrate Turkey into the European system of states. As Couloumbis asserts, 
…enmeshing Turkey in the European integration system can help 
socialize Turkish elites into the European norms of behavior and 
increase their stake in a reforming course. The more Turkey is 
integrated into the European system, the less likely is to employ 
force. Rather, it will act as a prudent and satisfied member of the 
international system, once it becomes accustomed to the ‘rules of 
the game’ and understands the benefits that it can safeguard as 
well as bestow.217 
The Helsinki European Council stated that Turkey as a candidate country 
would join the EU based on the same criteria applied to the other candidate 
countries. Apart for the political criteria as formulated in 1992 by the Copenhagen 
European Council,218 the Council, however, attached two further explicit 
obligations. These included the notions of respecting principles of peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN, and resolving all outstanding 
territorial disputes and related issues, or submitting to the adjudication of the 
                                                 
215 See Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11,1999, Presidency Conclusions, 
par. 12, available from [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm;] 
Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004. 
216 George Papandreou, “Revision in Greek Foreign Policy,” Western Policy Center, Athens, 
January 1, 2000, available from, 
[http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=913&language=0&hilit
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217 Couloumbis and Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic 
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218 These include a general adherence to the political and economic aims of the EU 
(criterion concerning adoption of the Community Acquis), the existence of democratic institutions, 
the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities (political criterion)  and finally the 
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Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, par 7Aiii, 
available from [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf;] Internet, 
accessed on October 29, 2004. 
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International Court of Justice by 2004 at the latest. Moreover, Turkey had to 
facilitate the process of achieving a solution to the Cyprus political problem.219 It 
is obvious that the conception of resolving the territorial disputes prior to 
accession was directly related to the Greek-Turkish interaction, as it constituted 
both an alert and an incentive for Turkey to alter its attitude towards Greece. In 
other words, the establishment of a closer relationship between the EU and 
Turkey was related to the latter’s renunciation of threats of war and contribution 
to an acceptable solution of the Cyprus question.220 Specifically for the latter, 
Turkey had to make her best efforts towards “the reunification of Cyprus as a 
federal, bizonal and bicommunal state that is also a member of the European 
Union.”221 
Following the Helsinki development the European Commission stipulated 
a set of short and long term economic and political priorities aiming at the 
transformation of Turkey according to the Copenhagen Criteria. These were 
incorporated in the Turkey’s Accession Partnership document. Turkey in turn 
adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in March 
2001.222 The implementation of NPAA took the form of constitutional 
amendments and ‘harmonization laws’ that were targeted towards various critical 
aspects of the Turkish state, whose in place provisions were largely incompatible 
                                                 
 219 See Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, par. 
4 and 9a. 
220 Couloumbis, “Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities,” Couloumbis, Kariotis, and 
Bellou, Greece in the Twentieth Century, 36. Nicolaides, on the other hand, provides a different 
explanation, describing the EU statement also as a form of “exercise in constructive ubiquity and 
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Nicolaides, “Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status after Helsinki,” 
245-247 at Kalypso Nicolaides, “Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy 
Status after Helsinki,” in Keridis and Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of 
Globalization, 266 
221 Ibid. 
222 For the complete context see Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA), available from [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/npaa_full.pdf;] 
Internet, accessed on October, 30, 2004.  
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with the European practice.223 As part of the institutionalization Turkey's 
candidacy support, a special Greek ‘Task Force’ was set up to offer European-
affairs expertise to the Turkish side. To that extent, several seminars and 
bilateral meetings have been organized, during which high-ranking officials of the 
Turkish Administration have been briefed by their Greek counterparts on the EU 
regulations on various subjects. 
The NPAA, however, represented at the same time a delicate balance at the 
Turkish domestic politics level, namely, the balance between the “anti-EU” 
coalition or “euro-skeptics” and euro-pros. The former are represented primarily 
by the major part of the powerful Turkish military establishment, high-level state 
bureaucrats, major labor associations, conservative political figures in the right-
of-center parties, and paradoxically the left-oriented Nationalistic Action Party 
(MHP) and Democratic Left Party (DSP). The “pro-EU” circles represent the 
majority of the Turkish society. These circles include representatives of the big 
business community, namely, the Turkish Industrialists and Business Association 
(TUSIAD), various liberal think tanks, political parties located at the center-left 
and center-right parties, and most importantly, the pro-religious Justice and 
Development Party (AKP).224 Önis vividly depicted the struggle at the domestic 
politics level arguing that 
…the concrete possibility of the EU membership has resulted in a 
series of divisions within what could be described as “the ruling 
bloc” or “power elite.” What could be described as “transnational 
business elites,” including domestic business and external investor 
community with an interest in the Turkish economy saw the EU 
anchor as means of consolidating the kind of economic 
environment conducive to their long-term interests. In contrast, the 
privileged position of military-security establishment, both in terms 
                                                 
223 These include political liberalization and democratization of the state including inter alia 
the rights of the Kurdish minority, and the role of the military as expressed by the military 
dominated National Security Council (NSC). Ziya Önis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms 
and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," Turkish Studies, Vol. 
4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 12-13.  
224 Ibid., 17-21. See also Tarik Oguzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratization in the Context of the 
EU Accession Process' on the Turkish Foreign Policy," Mediterranean Politics Vol. 9, no. 1 
(Spring 2004), 103-106. Interesting, as the author points out, is the Turkish idiosyncrasy that left- 
wing parties do not espouse liberal ideas as the European social democratic left parties. 
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of economic weight and social status, appeared to be particularly 
threatened by the kind of reforms proposed by the EU.225 
Elaborating on the views expressed by these two factions in the domestic 
level, one should note the following. First, the “euro-skeptics” generally are 
skeptical about the characteristics of the accession process, as they want to 
bargain over the terms, rather than comply with EU’s directives. Most importantly, 
in the foreign politics field, they are inclined to support the proposition that Turkey 
should formulate and implement foreign policy decisions independently of the 
external environment. Moreover, the prerequisite in order to follow European 
oriented foreign policy should be serving Turkey’s national security interests, by 
and large as defined by the armed forces. Second the “Pro-EU” emphasize that 
“Turkey should behave [in such a way] that would demonstrate sincerity on EU 
membership.” They support the view that the country’s democratization should 
also be extended in foreign policy behavior, suggesting that the country “should 
not adopt confrontational…and uncompromising attitudes towards foreign policy 
issues, especially those pertaining to Turkey-EU relations.”226 
Following two severe economic crises in 2001, the coalition government in 
Turkey collapsed, calling for early elections in November 2002. The combination 
of the high electoral threshold (10%), social discontent about political corruption, 
and the state mechanism’s inadequacy, as expressed during the earthquakes, 
swept away the old political elite and led to the election of the Justice and 
Development Party with a solid majority.227 The party’s leader, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, a moderate Islamist himself, and his government continued major 
political, constitutional and legislative reforms. Notable examples included, first, 
                                                 
225 Önis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU 
Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," 21. The forces described by Önis are also known as “deep 
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the appointment, for the first time, of a civilian as Secretary General of the 
controversial NSC, and second, the abolition of State Security Courts. Finally, on 
October 2004 the Commissioner on EU enlargement released the long-awaited 
European Commission’s recommendation on the formal Accession of Turkey.228  
The report emphasized the progress achieved between 2001 and 2004, in 
all aspects while pointing out specific shortcomings in all areas of the Aquis.229 
Important to this report is that in regard to the enhanced political dialogue the 
document indicated that “Turkish foreign policy is contributing to regional 
stability.” On the shortcomings side the report notes that while “the process of 
fully aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is underway; nevertheless, 
the armed forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of 
informal mechanisms.”230 Moreover, the irreversibility of the instituted reforms as 
noted need to be tested over a longer period of time. As a final point, it must be 
emphasized that the overall recommendation is positive and if approved by the 
December 2004 European Council, the date for the beginning of the accession 
negotiations is expected to be set in 2005. However, the whole process itself will 
most likely be a protracted one lasting at least ten years.  
On the other hand, in Greece the Simitis government that instituted the 
policy shift vis-à-vis Turkey continued to support it. Despite frequent party 
polarization, mainly for domestic consumption, even in the foreign policy domain 
there was a consensus among the major political parties for supporting the 
European perspective of Turkey. Most important, however, is to emphasize the 
view of the new conservative Karamanlis government that was elected in March 
                                                 
228 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Recommendation of the European Commission on 
Turkey’s progress towards accession, Brussels, October 6, 2004, COM(2004), p.1-18, available 
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Internet, accessed on October 6, 2004.  
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elections.” ibid., 3, [emphasis mine]. 
230 Ibid., 11. 
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2004.231 While there was an initial concern about the orientation of the Greek 
foreign policy after the appointment of the new Foreign Minister, Petros 
Moliviatis,232 Prime Minister Karamanlis himself clarified the intentions of the new 
government. He expressed his firm commitment to actively support Turkey’s EU 
aspirations, stating that “I confirm the support of the Greek government and me 
personally as to Turkey's course towards Europe and Mr. Erdogan's reform 
program."233 
 
4. The Cyprus Question 
The Cyprus problem has been an outstanding issue and of concern to the 
international community for almost fifty years. It was the most controversial and 
complex point of conflict in the Greek-Turkish relationship since 1955. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the issue per se was disengaged from the 
rapprochement process, in order to better assess Greek-Turkish relations in the 
context of this study it is useful to examine how the issue has evolved since 
1999. That is due to the symbiotic relations between Turkey and the self- 
proclaimed TNRC and the Cyprus Republic. Moreover, the European vocation of 
both Cyprus and Turkey is of equal importance. 
The government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) applied for EU-
membership in July 1990, and the accession negotiations started in March 1998.  
As the Greek-Turkish thaw was developing following the 1999 Helsinki decision 
concerning Turkey’s future membership and in lieu of RoC’s accession (expected 
in 2003), yet another effort to resolve the Cyprus problem was initiated in 
                                                 
231 Karamanlis’ conservative party New Democracy (ND) was elected with 45.36% of the 
votes and 165 out of the 300 Parliament seats. 
232 The 75year old former ambassador Moliviatis was diplomatic advisor of the late 
Konstantinos Karamanlis and was considered by analysts to have a Cold War like mentality. 
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December 1999.234 The rationale was to utilize the momentum created by the 
expectation of RoC accession in the EU in order to re-unify the long divided 
island, so that it would enter the EU as a unified entity. The effort included 
intercommunal “proximity talks” with no preconditions under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary-General.235 The proximity talks were held from December 1999 to 
November 2000 and were followed by direct talks between January 2002 and 
February 2003. During the instituted process, negotiating bilaterally the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots were unable to reach an agreement, and consequently third 
party contribution was necessary.236 
Accordingly, the Secretary-General submitted a settlement proposal on 
November 2002, and two consequent revisions in December 2002 and February 
2003. The plan was entitled “Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the 
Cyprus Problem,” and at the end of the negotiations process it required a 
referendum in late March 2003 to approve it, thus permitting the re-unified 
Cyprus to participate in the ceremonial signing of the Accession Treaty in April 
2003.237 All three proposals were accepted as a basis for discussion by the 
former and current presidents of the RoC, Clerides and Papadopoulos, but 
proved unacceptable to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas. It must be emphasized 
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structure of two peoples and two sovereign states while entrenching special relations with Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey and Greek Cypriots and Greece.” See Tozun Bahcheli, “Turkey’s Cyprus 
Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974” in Martin and Keridis, The Future of Turkish Foreign 
Policy, 220. 
237 Directorate-A Division for International and Constitutional Affairs DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and its 
Relations with the EU. (Luxembourg, March 14, 2003)., 9, available from 
[http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/cypr/20030409/494068EN.pdf;] Internet, 
accessed on November 9, 2004. 
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that the intransigence of the latter was fully supported by the Turkish general 
Staff, Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the bureaucracy of the foreign 
ministry, despite the popular opposition of the Turkish Cypriots, who were in 
support of the plan.238 Moreover, according to Birand the Turkish government 
and the governing AK party  
…has been, generally speaking, uninformed and undecided on the 
Cyprus issue. Rather than taking a political decision and trying to 
have it implemented the Gul government spent a lot of time by 
trying to persuade those circles -- that includes Denktas -- who did 
not believe in a solution. The government chose to postpone the 
decision. And, in the end, it bowed down to those who hold the 
opposing view.239 
At that point the Turkish government was pinned down by the indecision 
exhibited. More analytically, the Accession Partnership between Turkey and the 
EU was based on the spirit and the wording of the 1999 Helsinki communiqué. 
The “Principles” chapter of the Accession Partnership stated that “the European 
Union encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support the UN 
Secretary General's efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem, to a successful conclusion.”240 Turkey, in turn, 
included the same obligation in its NPAA. The program incorporated the pledge 
that “Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in 
the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable 
                                                 
238 Cengiz Candar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War in Iraq,” in Martin and Keridis, The 
Future of Turkish foreign policy, ( 48-49. This assertion was confirmed by the Turkish press. Days 
prior to the rejection of the plan Denktas was in Ankara for consultations. Birand points out that  
[t]he Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) played the most effective role in bringing about the 
rejection of the Annan Plan. […] The conclusion the TSK has reached is that this plan 
has hazardous aspects. […] This way the TSK has shown everybody who takes the 
decisions in Turkey. 
See Mechmet Ali Birand, “Denktas wins again,” Turkish Daily News, March 12, 2003 available 
from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_12_03/birand.htm;] Internet, accessed on 
November 9, 2004. 
239 Birand, “Denktas wins again.” 
240 The Council of the European Union, Turkey’s Accession Partnership, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, March 8, 2001, available from http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf;] Internet, November 5, 2004.  
In 2003 it was incorporated in the revised Accession Partnership under the “Short-term” and 
“Long-term priorities” and with the new title “Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria.”  
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settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the 
sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the Island.”241 
It is useful to note that the Turkish foreign minister in June 2002, 
elaborating on the principles of the NPAA, outlined what was acceptable to 
Turkey in order to break the stalemate in the Cyprus problem. According to Cem, 
the solution of the Cyprus problem ought to be based on a “new partnership 
state” that would represent “both nations of Cyprus on matters for which it is 
empowered through an agreement between the two constituent states.” 
Moreover, both sides had to “agree on all matters that the parties consider as 
vital.”242 The notions articulated in the NPAA, as well as the Turkish foreign 
minister article, do appear to have a striking similarity with Denktas’s 
preconditions set in 1998 before the initiation of the process. 
With the possibility of RoC joining the EU in May 2004, a new effort was 
undertaken by the UN Secretary-General in February 2004. The new 
negotiations process had a concluding date of March 31, 2004. The intense 
month of negotiations that followed did not produce tangible results. During the 
last phase of negotiations between 24-29 March 2004 in Switzerland, both prime 
ministers of Greece and Turkey, Karamanlis and Erdogan, were invited to lend 
their collaboration, and moreover, the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas was 
excluded or self-excluded for the remainder of the process.243 However, once 
                                                 
241 Turkish National Programmme for the Adoption of the Aquis, 5. 
242 See Ismail Cem, "A common vision for Cypriots; It's not too late," International Herald 
Tribune, March 14, 2002, available from [http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] 
Internet, November 9, 2004. [emphasis mine].The vital matters according to Cem include:  
For the Greek party, the confirmation of a single international personality to represent 
Cyprus in international relations and forums; 
For the Turkish party, the confirmation of two equal separate states, each as a 
sovereign entity, forming through an agreement a new partnership state. 
Moreover, the struggle in the Turkish Foreign Minister’s thinking is difficult to follow. On the one 
hand in the same article he argues about the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that “are two different 
nations, cultures, religions, languages and states, and a heritage of mistrust and bloody feuds,” 
difficult to reconcile while he pursues the Greek-Turkish rapprochement were at minimum the 
same characteristics apply [all emphasis mine]. 
243  Esra Aygin, “Missing Denktas” Associated Press, Fuerigen, Switzerland, March 29, 2004 
available from [http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_29_04/for.htm#f8;] Internet, 
accessed on November 9, 2004. Interestingly, Denktas remained in northern Cyprus campaigning 
against the adoption of the plan that was aiming to create a Greek Cypriot republic 
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more no agreement was reached. The text of the reunification plan was finalized 
by the Secretary General and submitted to simultaneous referenda in April 2004 
by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
The Plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek 
Cypriots. 244  The reasons however, that that led the Greek Cypriots to reject in 
the referendum the “Annan Plan” are not important per se for the purposes of this 
thesis. It must however be noted that both the fourth and fifth versions of the 
“Annan Plan” aiming at persuading the Turkish Cypriot leader to concede to the 
reunification of the Island, refer to the new anticipated state reflecting not only the 
spirit but also the wording that the Turkish Foreign Minister used in his 2002 
“Common Vision for Cypriots.” Specifically Article 2 of the final version of the 
“Annan Plan” stipulates that  
The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its 
federal government, and its constituent states, is modeled on the 
status and relationship of Switzerland, […]. Accordingly:  
a. The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the 
form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and 
two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the 
Turkish Cypriot State. […]. The United Cyprus Republic is 
organized under its Constitution in accordance with the basic 
principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican 
government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of 
the constituent states.  
b. The federal government sovereignty exercises the powers 
specified in the Constitution, which shall ensure that Cyprus can 
speak and act with one voice internationally and in the European 
Union,[…] 
c. The constituent states are of equal status. Within the limits 
of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested 
by the Constitution in the federal government, …245 
The second important issue is that the Turkish policy with respect to the 
solution of the Cyprus political problem appears to be altered. Prime Minister 
                                                 
244 The Turkish Cypriots approved the “Annan Plan” by 64.9%.The Greek Cypriots rejected it 
by 75.8%. See “Final Results of Cyprus Referenda,” Athens News Agency, April 24, 2004 
available from [http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet; accessed on 
November 9, 2004. 
245 Available from [http://194.154.157.106/Main_Articles/MainArticles.pdf;] Internet, accessed 
on November 5, 2004, [all emphasis mine]. 
83 
Erdogan did succeed in isolating the hardliner Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas, 
and the Turkish Cypriots in the referendum did agree on the finalized version of 
“Annan plan,” contrary to the Greek Cypriots. This indeed represents a qualitative 
difference in the Turkish government’s practice, at least at the declaratory 
level.246 Notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish government appeared to have 
Denktas isolated, a closer scrutiny reveals that the final version of the Annan 
plan largely reflects the adamant ideas of the recalcitrant Denktas.247 Turkey 
clearly opted to serve her own national interest and transcended its domestic 
policies by isolating extremist Turkish-Cypriot views. In other words, Turkey 
managed to exhibit good will and reconciliatory politics, at least towards the EU, 
despite her controversial strategy of not formally recognizing the Cypriot state, a 
member of the EU, while at the same time expecting consensus from the latter 
for its accession. Turkey managed to embellish her rhetoric on the Cyprus issue. 
However, the crux of the arguments on the issue appears to be the same, but in 
any case Denktas’s marginalization does constitute a noticeable milestone in the 
process. 
 
5. Cooperation at the Political Plane and the “High Politics” 
Issues 
From the initiation of the rapprochement process, the so called “high 
politics” or the issues of “increased antagonism” were excluded from the agenda. 
The  rationale  was  that  there  could  not  be  any  significant  breakthrough in a  
                                                 
246 It is worth noting the rhetoric used in November 2000 by the Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit, 
who claimed that “if a solution on the Cyprus and Aegean issues could not be reached in line with 
Turkey’s expectations, Turkey’s reaction would not be only verbal […] The EU deceived Turkey. 
Turkey cannot give concessions […] EU members do not have a monopoly of being European. 
Turkey has been European for the last 600 years.” See Bulent Ecevit, Turkiye Newspaper, 23 
November 2000, as quoted in Gregory R. Copley, “Asymmetry Among Allies,” Defense and 
Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol. 29, Is. 1, January 2001, 7-8, available from 
[http://proquest.umi.com;] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004. 
247 It is plausible to argue, while not factually confirmed, that the UN Secretary General was 
aiming to curb Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot intransigence on the issue. In other words, since 
Cyprus and Greece were aiming at the reunification and were more open to their options to 
achieve it, Kofi Annan was anxious to get Turkish-Cypriot endorsement of his plan. In this manner 
he crossed a subtle but important line in his concessions to accommodate Turkish anxieties, 
which did not allow any further watering down from the Greek–Cypriot side; the direct ramification 
of this strategy appears to be  the rejection of the plan from the Greek-Cypriot side. 
84 
prevailing atmosphere of mutual mistrust. As part of its European aspirations and 
according to the 1999 Helsinki communiqué Turkey like all other candidate states 
has 
…to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes 
…Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will 
review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in 
particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process 
and in order to promote their settlement through the International 
Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.248 
As a follow-on Turkey in its conceived NPAA undertook the pledge that “…[the 
country] will continue to develop her relations with neighboring countries on the 
basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy; in this context, Turkey will continue to 
undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems 
through dialogue with Greece.”249  As Ifantis and Ayden asserted “…Turkey’s 
own interest, in advancing towards EU membership has created a strong 
incentive to solve the Aegean issues.”250  
In February 2002 Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and his Greek 
counterpart, Papandreou, exploited the opportunity provided by the World 
Economic Forum meetings and set forth a procedure focusing on the 
aforementioned commitments. The two foreign ministers agreed on a series of 
meetings where diplomats from both sides would touch upon the “high-politics” 
issues. The delegations of technocrats were headed by Undersecretary Ugur 
Ziyal and Foreign Ministry Secretary General Anastasios Skopelitis, 
respectively.251 The two delegations initiated a series of “exploratory talks,” the 
aim of which was “…to highlight each [of] the issues each side considers as [of] 
primary or secondary importance and as negotiable or non-negotiable, as well as 
                                                 
248 Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, par. 4. 
249 Turkish National Programmme for the Adoption of the Aquis, 5. 
250 Aydin and Ifantis, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean, ( 10. 
251 “Greek-Turkish 'exploratory dialogue' begins in Ankara,” Athens News Agency, February 
13, 2002 available from 
[http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=332&article=10
099;] Internet, accessed on November 3, 2004.  
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the understandings of each other’s perceptions, interests, incentives, constraints, 
preferences, priorities and bottom lines.”252 
In the “High politics” issues the staring official positions of the two 
countries diverge significantly. Both countries are advocating in favor of the 
status quo, as it is respectively understood. For Greece, in terms of International 
Law the only unresolved issue between the two countries is the delimitation of 
the continental shelf of the Aegean. The rest of the issues raised by Turkey are 
characterized by Greece as unilateral claims. Furthermore, Greece supports the 
argument that this technical issue should be resolved through the ICJ.  Turkey, 
on the other hand, considers the nature of the disputes as political and argues in 
favor of the balance that the Lausanne Treaty established between the two 
countries in the Aegean.253 To that extent, for Turkey, the delimitation of the 
continental shelf is among a series of interrelated problems that include: the 
breath of territorial waters and airspace; the militarization of the eastern Aegean 
islands; the sovereign status of various islands in the Aegean not explicitly 
mentioned as ceded to Greece in the Lausanne and Paris Treaties; the lack of an 
agreement setting the maritime boundaries between the two countries; Search 
and Rescue (SAR) as well as command and control issues within the Aegean in 
the context of NATO; and the status of the Muslim minority in Thrace.254 
Elaborating further, it is important to note that the breadth of the territorial 
waters and the delimitation of the continental shelf are closely intertwined issues, 
since the latter is measured starting at the outer limit of the territorial waters. In 
                                                 
252 Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century,” 123. 
253 As already noted the Lausanne Treaty exludes the Dodecanese Islands that were ceded 
to Greece after WWII. 
254 For the view from Athens see “Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean,” Hellenic 
Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from 
[http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims.html;] 
Internet, accessed on October 19, 2004. For the view from Ankara see “Background Note on the 
Aegean Dispute,” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 29, 2004 available from 
[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/Gre
eceLinks/Background_Note_on_Aegean_Dispute.htm;] Internet, accessed on October 19, 2004.  
For widely accepted synopsis of the origins and the evolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes up to  
1979, see Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, (5-28, for an updated summary see Carol Migdalovitz, 
Greece and Turkey Aegean Issues-Background and Recent Development, Congressional 
Research Service, Report for Congress, The library of Congress, 97-799F, August, 21 1997, 1-4. 
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turn the breadth of the territorial waters according to 1982 UNCLOS III can 
extend up to 12 nautical miles. Turkey which is not a signatory part of UNCLOS 
paradoxically invokes it and argues that if Greece extends its territorial waters 
from six to twelve nautical miles, the Aegean Sea will become Mare Grecum. In 
June 1995, the Turkish National Assembly’s responded to the Greek Parliament's 
May 1995, ratification of the UNCLOS with a casus belli threat by unanimously 
adopting a pertinent resolution.255 
The instituted process of approaching the “high politics” issues resembles 
the similar effort that an identical political committee unsuccessfully undertook 
within the frame of the 1988 Davos process. Since the inauguration of the 
“exploratory talks” the two delegations have concluded, as of July 2004, 27 
sessions of deliberations. Information from relevant press releases is extremely 
limited. The process from its beginning is vaguely described as aiming to identify 
“points of convergence" while the atmosphere in the diplomatic language is 
referred to as "fruitful and positive."256 Notwithstanding the fact of the scarce 
information, one can safely presume that Turkey has raised the series of issues 
which Greece characterizes as unilateral claims. On this point it must be noted 
that for Greece, the process constitutes in its own right a great departure from its 
previous adamant position.257 Moreover, the Greek Premier Minister Karamanlis 
on September 2004 pointed out that the deadline of the Helsinki Communiqué 
was not feasible, and the talks, as long as progress is maintained, should 
                                                 
255 The resolution stipulates that: 
[w]hile hoping that the Greek Government shall not decide to extent its territorial 
sea in the Aegean beyond the present 6 miles limits, which in turn would ruin the 
equilibrium established by the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, has decided to grand the Turkish government all powers, including 
those in the military field, for safe guarding and defending the vital interests of 
Turkey in such eventuality. 
See George P. Politakis, “The Aegean Dispute in the 1990s,” in Theodore Kariotis, Greece and 
the Law of the Sea, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 317, [authors emphasis]. 
256 “Second round of Greek-Turkish 'exploratory talks' begins,” Athens News Agency, April 
12, 2002 available from 
[http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=329&article=92
21;] Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.  
257 Irini Karanasopoulou, “Baltonei o dialogos [Dialogue Stall],” Ta Nea, Athens, July 12, 
2004, available from [http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr/neaweb/neafile.pf?entypo=A&my_fyllo=17985;] 
Internet, accessed on October 29, 2004.  
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continue into 2005 and beyond. This argument is a further proof of the Greek 
good will and in many ways entails confidence in the instituted process. In other 
words Greece takes for granted, at least at the present stage, the sincerity of 
Turkey’s intentions.258 
In a manner remarkably parallel with the end stages of the 1988 Davos 
process, however, Ankara continues to convey mixed messages to Athens. The 
Turkish Air Force is the main apparatus used as leverage for this task. According 
to data presented by the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Cristedes, in June 2003, 
for the year 2000 the violations of the 10-nautical mile limit total 447. The figure 
increased to 974 for year 2001. The violations quadrupled to 3,421 in 2002. 
Furthermore, in the first six months of 2003 there were a total of 2,161 violations. 
Of these 1,507 came within the three-mile limit, and 72 of the violations involved 
overflights of Greek settled areas.259 The phenomenon is perpetuating and has 
been further intensified in the months that followed the end of the Athens 2004 
Summer Olympics. 
Contrasting the NPAA with the violations of Greek air space reveals a 
remarkable paradox. Based on European standards as expressed through the 
acquis, it is exceptional for one country to argue and bluntly present claims 
against another, supporting them by military means260 Moreover, this 
phenomenon provides conclusive evidence for the existence of a struggle at the 
                                                 
258 The Greek Prime Minister used direct language saying that: [emphasis mine] 
I don't believe that the seabed issue should be treated with the logic of an 
exclusive December deadline. It's an issue that has preoccupied us for 30 years. 
Should that lead us to reject Turkey's choice to join Europe? ... I say no.  
As quoted in Harry Papachristou, "Greek PM praises Turkey's EU-inspired reforms," Agence 
France Presse, September 12, 2003. available from  
[http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet, accessed on October 31, 2004  
259 Sedat Ergin, "Turkey: Greece's Ambassador cites Sharp Increase in Airspace Violations," 
Financial Times Information, Global News Wire, June 19, 2003.available from [http://80-web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil;] Internet, accessed on November 9, 2004. 
260 Arguably European continent has to exhibit several antitheses and divergent opinions 
between the European states. One tangible example is the status of Gibraltar. While Spain 
argues that British sovereignty over the “Rock” should be terminated at some point, the Spanish 
air force does not overfly Gibraltar to exhibit Spanish aspirations. In other words even if someone 
in good faith argued that the extent of Greek airspace constitutes an exceptional case in the 
International Law realm it is most certain that armed aircraft constantly violating the limit would be 
considered as provocative behavior. 
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Turkish domestic level as already noted. Such an assertion is effortlessly 
supported by the statement of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General. 
Hilmi Ozkok who, in June 2003, asserted that the "Turkish jets will fly wherever 
they want over the Aegean Sea."261  
While this needless increase in tension is occurring, both countries at the 
political plane are engaged in cooperative initiatives which reveal the paradox of 
the relationships. Recognizing the political nature and the potential destabilizing 
effect of military maneuvers, both countries canceled military exercises in 
Cyprus. Moreover the Turkish prime minister, during his visit in Greece in May 
2004, visited the Muslim minority in Thrace, becoming the first Turkish prime 
minister to do so since 1952. In his address he used different rhetoric than that 
used by past Turkish officials. He encouraged the members of the minority to 
work for a stronger Greece, stating that “I believe wholeheartedly that a strong 
Greece will provide you with greater benefits.”262 
Thus the crux of the paradox is that while Turkey declares in bombastic 
rhetoric its political will and apparently the will of the majority of its people to 
transform the Turkish state and adopt the behests of the European practice, at 
the same time it acts aggressively towards a neighboring country that has made 
many steps for reconciliation and rapprochement. This is a kind of diglosia, a flip-
flop policy. On one hand exhibit good faith and symbolic gestures which by and 
large mean nothing and deflate after a certain time, while on the other retain 
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seen at risk," The Washington Times, June 5, 2003., available from [http://80-web.lexis-
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262 As quoted in “Erdogan visits W. Thrace,” Kathimerini English Edition, May 5, 2004, 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Although the thaw in relations since 1999 has provided renewed hopes for 
a comprehensive reconciliation, the two countries have not reached yet the point 
where the “security dilemma” can be overcome to make way to peaceful 
coexistence…”263 Moreover, it is unknown whether the achieved level of 
interdependence between the two countries has reached the point of 
irreversibility, although it has reached unprecedented levels compared with the 
past. However, one should pay close attention to past historical examples in 
which the rapprochement was reversed and ultimately vanished. 
A series of major shifts in Greek foreign policy have occurred since 1996. 
The most prominent has been the reversal towards a more relaxed attitude 
towards Turkey’s European aspirations. Later that attitude would become a 
complete u-turn with Greece providing full support for Turkey’s accession.  
 Present reconciliation has reached an astonishing level of cooperation 
between the two countries. In the “low politics” issues as well as in those 
perceived as of high friction both Greece and Turkey have exhibited qualitative 
differences over past periods of détente. However, the issue is whether the 
rapprochement is self-sustainable regardless of the politics dominating the 
domestic level of both countries. For Greece one can argue that there is a 
continuum in the process. The country has moved tacitly and tangibly away from 
obdurate premises which formerly dominated its foreign policy. For example, 
whereas Greece was not accepting any other dispute except the demarcation of 
the continental shelf, it has now entered a bilateral procedure where the Turkish 
side can raise any issue with no restrictions. Moreover, for Greece the 
reconciliation process was always to be based on a step-by-step procedure. This 
is even explicitly declared in Papandreou’s response to Cem’s letter.264 However, 
the working groups and the commissions of experts between the two countries 
discuss every issue. Several other examples can be argued from both sides. 
                                                 
263 Aydin, “Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities,” 22. 
264 See page 56 of this study. 
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Nonetheless, the main issue of the current rapprochement revolves around 
Turkey’s European aspirations and how these will evolve in the near future and in 
the mid term. Without any doubt, present rapprochement is as much alike as 
different when contrasted with past efforts. For instance, something like fifteen 
years earlier the reconciliation process was exhausted in a mixed messages 
atmosphere, together with massive airspace violations. Roughly the same 
background exists today. The qualitative difference, however, is that besides 
policymakers and officials, businesses and people are involved to a greater 
extent. The earthquakes and the bottom-up approach of the two peoples as 
already mentioned infused new air into the process. Once such a process is 
based on the changed perceptions of the populace, the policy will be reoriented 
as well, except in the case where more extreme views and measures prevail. 
Moreover, today Europe provides a multilateral-multinational context in which 
Greek-Turkish relations have to function. This context is dominated and 
governed by certain rules and norms which have no room for exceptions that 
undermine them. Extremities are not well perceived by the European nations, 
which see democracy as the basic premise of cooperation. In fact, extremities 
are rather measures of self-exclusion from the European family. Most likely the 
question whether or not the rapprochement has overcome the tipping point will 



















 Greek-Turkish relations have long constituted one of the thorny issues in 
international politics and have been a source of instability in the eastern 
Mediterranean, constituting a potential flashpoint. The periods of détente, since 
they are few and short in duration, obviously suffer from the small-n problem. 
However, as the former are examined in this thesis, a number of safe historical 
generalizations can be concluded, and as such they form a historical paradigm of 
past unsuccessful efforts to normalize bilateral relations. 
 The analysis in Chapter II demonstrated that cooperative relations are 
feasible in both worlds, whether realist or liberal. The review of previous attempts 
at rapprochement in Chapter III revealed that cooperative bilateral relations 
between Greece and Turkey occurred always in an instrumental manner. That is, 
the two countries had largely divergent starting points, when potential strong (to a 
large extent charismatic) leaders could isolate these policies from public 
pressure. Moreover, these efforts collapsed once the national interests of the two 
countries diverged.  
From the analysis in the Chapter IV it is safe to assume that the latest 
rapprochement represents not a tactical move but rather a strategic shift and a 
qualitative paradigm shift in the Greek policy towards Turkey. Greece being part 
of the EU since 1981 and for over 20 years is gradually becoming a postmodern 
anti-war state. By lifting its veto Greece, Turkey, denounced the tactics of using 
the EU membership as a bargaining chip while simultaneously addressed a 
longstanding Turkish demand. That is to be formally accepted as a member of 
the European family of nations. Historical analysis however indicates and 
confirms what contemporary analysts point out. That is that the sustainability of 
such policy has inherent limits if not accompanied by reciprocal gestures. 
 Turkey, on the other hand, has limited its contribution in the current 
rapprochement to employing cooperative rhetoric and symbolic gestures towards 
Greece. Both rhetoric and gestures appear to represent a qualitative difference 
but do not address any of the core issues. Moreover, as the empirical evidence 
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advocate, Turkey has not reciprocated to a substantial degree to Greece’s 
strategic policy shift. Instead it has initiated a sort of mixed messages policy, with 
the use of its air force making the sustainability of the process at the Greek 
domestic level ambivalent. The expectation to become a member of the EU 
resulted in a remarkable number of changes in Turkey’s domestic structures that 
will eventually enhance and deepen the existing level of democracy. However, 
the accession is not guaranteed, and most certainly its duration will be 
prolonged. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the future of the rapprochement is 
directly linked to the anticipated decision of the European Council on December 
17, 2004. Furthermore, the outcome of the council will have a definite impact 
upon the perceptions of the Turkish political elite265 who formulate Turkish 
foreign policy. As the Commissioner on EU enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, 
vividly put it, “[T]he real hardship will start after getting the date [to start the 
accession negotiations]”266 
The democratic peace theory may have proved, yet without establishing 
causality, that democracies do not fight each other. However, as the late 
president of the United States John Fitzgerald Kennedy has observed, “The mere 
absence of war is not peace.” Moreover, it remains to be seen if the fundamental 
checks and balances embedded in democracies, and specifically for purposes of 
this thesis in Greece and Turkey, will allow both countries to resolve issues of 
friction and fully normalize their relations in the European context.  
As Thucydides argued two millennia ago, honor, fear and interests are the 
causes of war. It appears that Greece has finally worked “to reduce its neighbors’ 
                                                 
 265 The Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gull was indicative and confirming when he 
argued about a negative EU decision:  
If the political decision is not objective and not fair, then there will be negative 
repercussions in Turkey, the EU and across the whole world, because Turkey's 
membership is very important. [emphasis mine] 
 see Turkish daily News, Ankara , September 11, 2004, available from 
[http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/for.htm#f9;] Internet accessed on 
September 11, 2004. 
 266 As quoted in Mechmet Ali Birand, “The Opinion of Mechmet Ali Birand,” Turkish Daily 
News, Ankara, September 11, 2004, available from  
[http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/birand.htm;] Internet accessed on September 11, 
2004.  
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fears, to recognize its neighbors’ interests and – by doing so – to demonstrate 
the value of its honor.”267 Greece should continue on the same path, providing its 
support for Turkey’s aspirations to become a member of the EU. Turkey, on the 
other hand, has to reciprocate the shift of Greek policy and provide palpable 
evidence of alignment with the rules of the game in the European practice. A 
promising start would be revoking the 1995 casus belli threat which is certainly 

































                                                 
 267 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Greece & the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity,” in Graham T. 
Allison and Kalypso Nicolaides, The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance, (Cambridge, 
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